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Misinformed Consent

What we see [in obstetrics units] resembles childbirth as much as
artificial insemination resembles sexual intercourse.1
	A significant number of American women receive clinical birthing-option advice
from obstetrician-gynecologists (“ob-gyns”) without being informed of the nonmedical considerations that inf luence the recommendations they receive. This
professional custom may cause various adverse consequences to the women who
receive such recommendations. These adverse consequences include: (a) impairment
of a woman’s ability to consent to or refuse surgery or other treatment in an informed
manner; (b) reduction of available birthing services; and (c) restraint of qualified
non-obstetricians—including nurses, midwives, and family practice physicians—
from providing birthing services. By introducing undisclosed, non-medical
considerations into the formulation of birthing recommendations, ob-gyns also
subvert established American policies in favor of reducing the surgical delivery of
babies2 and against the restraint of trade in the healthcare field.3
The key premise of this paper is that the provision of medical advice in this
manner constitutes a human rights violation under both international and American
human rights norms. Part I of this paper first discusses the international and domestic
human rights norms that counsel respect for women’s rights to select the birthing
and healthcare options of their choice. Part II then examines the decline of midwifery
in the United States and the corresponding rise of professionalized medicine. Part
III discusses how professionalized medicine has resulted in a surge of ob-gynattended cesarean sections and laid the groundwork for the undisclosed, non-medical
considerations that influence (and limit) a woman’s birthing options today. Such
considerations include financial rewards and disincentives for individual healthcare
providers, the potential for legal liability flowing from a given clinical decision, and
political and social pressures that arise, not from the clinical presentation of any one
individual, but from a broader environment of social conflict.
	After these premises are examined generally, Part IV explores the formalized,
but non-governmental encouragement of delivery of babies by cesarean section (also
referred to as “C-section”) due, in part, to a restriction of available medical services
that support vaginal birth by women who have previously delivered by C-section
1.

Marsden Wagner, Born In the USA: How A Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed To
Put Women And Children First 1 (University of California Press 2006) (quoting Ronald Laing).

2.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Pub. Health Serv., Pub. No. 91-50213, Healthy
People 2000: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives (1991)
[hereinafter Healthy People 2000] (establishing C-section reduction goal of 15%); U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Serv., Pub. Health Serv., National Institutes of Health, Pub. No. 82-2067,
Cesarean Childbirth (1981), available at http://consensus.nih.gov/1980/1980Cesarean027html.htm
[hereinafter Cesarean Childbirth] (the Consensus Development Conference on Cesarean Childbirth
of the National Institutes of Child Health and Human Development convened in 1980 to sound the
alarm over the then record high American cesarean birth rate of 15%). See, e.g., Francis C. Notzon,
International Differences in the Use of Obstetric Interventions, 263 JAMA 3286, 3287 (1990).

3.

See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–11 (2006).
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(known as “VBAC,” or vaginal birth after cesarean).4 This section, in turn, argues
that by preventing access to VBACs, professional standards adopted by many
American ob-gyns not only violate women’s human rights as patients, but also
resemble anti-trade practices that violate women’s rights as consumers of medical
goods and services in a free market.
Part V suggests a remedy for these violations through greater transparency in the
delivery of medical services—particularly with respect to the establishment of clinical
practice standards by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(hereinafter “ACOG”), and through litigation to increase ob-gyn accountability. Part
VI concludes with a summary of this paper’s arguments.
I.

The Human Rights Context For Women’s Access to Healthcare

A. International Norms
The United States is one of the most dangerous places
in the industrialized world to give birth.5
Many prescriptive or proscriptive human rights norms relate specifically to the
provision of healthcare. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and wellbeing.”6 Various international documents shed light on the evolving “right” to health,
which has been recognized to various degrees by the international community, and
in many different formulations from country to country.
The United States often refrains from becoming a party signatory to a treaty that
provides for so-called “social and economic rights,” as opposed to the “civil and
political rights” on which the U.S. was historically founded. This results in the denial
of direct enforcement power to American courts of law. Nonetheless, evolving
international norms—as ref lected in treaties, international custom, and
pronouncements from respected international organizations such as the United
Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Court, and the European Court
of Human Rights—are powerful, persuasive authority on the appropriate treatment
of human beings.7
4.

Comparative assessment of the clinical risks and benefits of various birthing methods, locations, and
care providers is beyond the scope of this paper (and beyond the qualifications of the author). Health
factors specific to a particular woman or baby, i.e., maternal age at first birth, confirmed parental
genetic risks, individual history of illness or surgery, and other patient-specific medical issues are not
evaluated.

5.

Michael J. Myers, ACOG’s Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Standard: A Market Restraint Without Remedy?,
49 S.D. L. Rev. 526, 527 (2003).

6.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).

7.

The history and sources of international human rights are beyond the scope of this paper. For purposes
of the instant discussion, international human rights norms are presumed to have at least persuasive
force. Often, they also carry enforcement authority in various national fora.
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	International standards are evidence of what the U.S. Supreme Court has called
“values we share with a wider civilization.”8 Any individual in any country may cite to
these norms in defense of his or her rights, as they reflect the expectations of relevant
actors in the international arena; that is, individual human beings are the subjects of
both national and international law.9
	Human rights refer to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are
entitled. There is a general international consensus that these rights include the right
to life, as well as the right to participate in culture, the right to food, the right to
work, and the right to education. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that each party to the Covenant “undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory . . . the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political,
or other opinion . . . birth, or other status.”10
	A right to health is specifically identified in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the “Covenant”), which states that its
subscribing countries (which number more than 150) “recognize the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”11
At the international level, compliance with the Covenant is tracked by the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In the year 2000, this committee issued a
General Comment elucidating the right to health.12
The General Comment is accorded substantial respect as an authoritative
statement of the Covenant by those charged with its implementation.13 The Comment
interprets the right to health as a web of related freedoms and entitlements, which
8.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).

9.

See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society:
Studies in Law, Science and Policy (New Haven Press 1992); Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, Power and Policy in Quest of Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985); W.
Michael Reisman & Eisuke Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for
Decisionmaking, in Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S.
McDougal 403 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); Myres S. McDougal et al., The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. Legal Educ. 253 (1967); Myres S. McDougal
et al., The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 807 (1988); Siegfried
Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal
Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. Int’l L. 316 (1999); W. Michael
Reisman, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture at the Proceedings of the 75th Convocation of the
American Society of International Law, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (Apr.
24, 1981) in 74 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 101 (1981).

10.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Feb. 23, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 360, 369.

11.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Feb. 23, 1967, 6 I.L.M.
363.

12.

U.S. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 14].

13.

See generally Amnesty Int’l, Caring for Human Rights: Challenges and Opportunities for Nurses and
Midwives AI Index: ACT 75/003/2006, June 15, 2006.
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include the right to control one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive
freedom, and the right to be free from interference, including torture, non-consensual
medical treatment, and experimentation. These entitlements also include the right to
a system of health protection that provides equal opportunity for people to enjoy the
“highest attainable standard of health.”14
The World Health Organization (“WHO”), which is affiliated with the United
Nations, defines health as a “state of complete physical, mental and social well-being,
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”15 In addition, “the right to health
should be understood as extending beyond health care to . . . ‘access to health-related
education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health.’”16 The
Preamble to the Constitution of WHO provides: “The enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.”17
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has developed a set of
criteria for assessing whether health facilities and services are compatible with these
human rights principles. One criterion is “accessibility of information, including the
right to seek, receive, and impart information, consistent with confidentiality of
personal data.”18
Certain international norms relate specifically to women’s health issues. For
example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women requires those countries that are parties to its treaty to “take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women . . . in particular to ensure . . .
[a]ccess to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and wellbeing of families, including information and advice on family planning.”19 Children
are accorded similar recognition in the international Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which requires subscribing countries to “take appropriate measures . . . to
ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers.”20
	As briefly illustrated herein—and as noted by Amnesty International—there is
an increasing body of international human rights law and commentary that sets out
the requirements of states to protect women’s sexual and reproductive rights in
authoritative terms.21

14.

General Comment No. 14, supra note 12, ¶ 1.

15.

WHO Const. pmbl.

16.

Amnesty Int’l, supra note 13, at 49–50 (quoting General Comment No. 14, supra note 12, ¶ 11).

17.

WHO Const., supra note 15.

18.

See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 13, at 50.

19.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art.
10, ¶ (h), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).

20. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 24, ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.

No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).

21.

See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 13.
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B. American Norms

	In the United States, women often encounter gender bias in medical diagnosis
and treatment.22 The quality of care received by women is also influenced by “general
cultural and societal bias.”23 A pervasive societal bias in the United States is “the
fantasy of omniscience and omnipotence, as embodied in the doctor who commands
the wondrous apparatus of modern science, [and] the fantasy of ignorance and
weakness, as embodied in the uncertain, dependent patient.”24
Nonetheless, there are many pertinent enforceable legal norms. The U.S.
Constitution is generally perceived as the acme of our legal authority. Many judicial
cases inform federal constitutional protection as it relates to giving birth. Although
rooted in other settings, broader doctrines premised on bodily autonomy may be
invoked in relation to pregnancy, labor, and delivery.
The right to refuse treatment is illustrative. Absent imposition of a court-ordered
medical guardian, the individual patient herself must be consulted for her informed
consent regarding surgical procedures and other treatment. In the context of
administration of psychotropic drugs, federal courts have acknowledged what they
call the “intuitively obvious proposition” that “a person has a constitutionally
protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to
submit to . . . serious and potentially harmful medical treatment . . . .”25
	Even persons subject to a guardianship are entitled to legal review prior to being
subjected to unwanted treatment and surgical intervention. A burden of proof must
be carried by the proponent of the treatment, who must show that: (1) the affected
individual would, if mentally competent, accept the treatment, or (2) that there is a
sufficiently important state interest that would override the individual’s refusal. 26
The U.S. Supreme Court has rooted the basis of these requirements in the due
process protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.27
22.

See, e.g., Bruce A. Bergelson & Carl L. Tommaso, Gender Differences in Clinical Evaluation and Triage in
Coronary Artery Disease, 108 CHEST 1510, 1510 (1995) (concluding that a gender-based selection bias
exists in choosing patients to undergo cardiac procedures); Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps,
Women’s Health and Managed Care, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 555, 580 (1998) (noting that “the mere increased
representation of women in clinical trials and the handful of federally-funded studies on health issues
specific to women will not ‘cure’ the problems emanating from a research structure that is accustomed
to treating men as the norm and women as the exception.”); Tiffany F. Theodos, The Patient’s Bill of
Rights: Women’s Rights Under Managed Care and ERISA Preemption, 26 AM. J. L. & Med. 89 (2000)
(detailing the need for increased patient protections for women); Mary Lake Polan, Medical Researchers,
Heal Thyselves of Gender Bias, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1991, at M2.

23.

Theodos, supra note 22, at 93; see also Oberman & Schaps, supra note 22.

24.

Harold J. Bursztain, Medical Choices, Medical Chances: How Patients, Families, and
Physicians Can Cope with Uncertainty, xxix (University Press 2001).

25.

See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).

26. See, e.g., Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415 (1981) (interpreting constitutional liberty interest

pertaining to the autonomy of the body).

27.

See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at 303.
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Failing to observe these requirements in the administration of unwanted medical
treatment has been described as a “massive curtailment of liberty.” 28 These
fundamental constitutional principles have been invoked to analyze the propriety of
surgical and other medical interventions during pregnancy, labor, and delivery.29 In
one example, a pregnant woman named Angela Carder refused to consent to a
C-section despite having cancer. Hospital officials sought and obtained a court order
approving surgical delivery of the fetus before administering cancer treatment. The
attending physicians subjected Ms. Carder—who had not been adjudicated mentally
incompetent (nor was she alleged to be)—to the unwanted surgery. Both Ms. Carder
and her baby died. In a rare posthumous ruling, a federal appeals court held on
constitutional grounds that a pregnant woman has the right to make all medical
decisions on behalf of herself and her fetus, noting that parents of born children
could not, by law, be forced to donate organs to their children or otherwise undergo
surgery to benefit existing children.30 The court also ruled that the state’s interest in
the viability of the fetus and in preventing any potential harm the mother might
cause to it by refusing treatment does not override her fundamental right to bodily
integrity and to refuse treatment.31
	In another example, a pregnant woman refused a blood transfusion, prompting
hospital officials to seek and obtain a court order for a forced transfusion. This time,
the presiding federal court declined the healthcare provider’s request, and instead
upheld the woman’s right to refuse the treatment in question despite the fact that she
was pregnant.32
	In addition to protections afforded at common law, various federal and state
statutes may provide or recognize additional rights or entitlements for women. For
example, at the federal level, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act33 prohibits hospitals and doctors from turning away a woman in active labor who
has come to a hospital building. In some circumstances a patient en route to a hospital
may satisfy the “has come to” requirement of the statute.34 At the state level, state

28. In re W.H., 144 Vt. 595, 597, 599 (1984).
29. The legal and social controversy surrounding abortion is outside the scope of this paper. For instant

purposes, it should be noted that legal challenges to abortion or restrictions on abortion typically involve
criminalizing the actions of a woman who willingly undergoes a medical procedure that is the subject of
condemnation by certain parts of society. Forcible cesarean section, on the other hand, involves
subjection of a woman to a medical intervention to which she is opposed, thereby invoking autonomy
and privacy interests not present in the case of abortion. This distinction has important legal
ramifications within constitutional jurisprudence.

30. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
31.

The constitutional jurisprudence of pregnancy termination is distinct. See supra note 29.

32.

In re Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

33.

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a)–(c) (2006).

34. See Morales v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficencia, 524 F.3d 54, 60–62 (1st Cir.

2008).
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constitutions may recognize more extensive liberty interests for women than those
independently protected by the federal constitution.35
Finally, state common law may afford some protections to pregnant women in
the form of civil malpractice lawsuits, complaints to medical boards, or both. For
instance, in 2005, a Massachusetts woman sued her healthcare providers for
performing an unwanted C-section, contrary to her previously stated preference for a
vaginal birth. The jury found that the surgery was not medically necessary, and that
it resulted in physical injuries that left the woman largely bedridden and unable to
perform normal life tasks for several years. The woman was awarded $1.5 million for
the violation of her rights, plus the costs associated with her injuries and home-care
needs.36
II.	The History of Birthing options in America: an Emerging Human
RIghts Issue

A woman is a uterus surrounded by a supporting organism.37
The human rights aspect of some birthing issues is palpable at a glance—for
example, the penal practice of shackling detainees during labor and delivery. 38 Other
birthing practices, however, require some analysis to reveal their questionable nature
in relation to human rights. In the United States, most births occur in hospitals with
obstetricians attending. However, in many other highly developed countries—
including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and Japan—midwives attend
most births and far outnumber obstetricians. A brief historical look is
illuminating.39

35.

See e.g., Best v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 563 S.E.2d 573 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Bethea v.
Springhill Memorial Hosp., 833 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2002). A survey of relevant state jurisprudence is beyond
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, for instant purposes, that no state is at liberty to provide lesser
protections than those afforded at the federal level.

36. Meador v. Stahler & Gheridian (Middlesex Superior Court C.A. No. 88-6450, Mass. 1993). A

discussion of this case by the plaintiff ’s expert witness can be found at http://www.forensic-psych.com/
articles/artAskexp02.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).

37.

Kate Maloy, Birth or Abortion? Private Struggles in a Political World 47 (Perseus
Publishing 1992) (quoting Iago Gladstone).

38. In 2006, the United Nations Committee Against Torture issued a report condemning this continuing

American practice as a form of torture. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25,
2006).

39.

See Judith Rooks, The History of Childbearing Choices in the United States, Our Bodies Ourselves,
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book/companion.asp?id=22&compID=75 (last visited Oct. 8,
2009); see also Ina May Gaskin, Ina May’s Guide to Natural Childbirth (Bantam Books 2003);
Judith Rooks, Midwifery and Childbirth in America (Temple University Press 1997).
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A. Midwifery in the United States

Throughout most of history, the primary care providers at births were midwives.
Midwives attended almost all births in the American colonies, relying on and then
disseminating the skills learned in their British homeland.40 Slavery effectively
imported midwives from West Africa, who attended deliveries by both black and
white women in certain southern states. This engendered a post-Civil War legacy of
African-American midwives in most rural parts of the South. Such midwives were
referred to as “granny midwives” and tended laboring poor women of various races.41
American Indian tribes had their own midwives and midwifery traditions, now
mainly limited to work on reservations.42
With its fragmented and rural character, significant variation in midwifery
practices and laws predictably developed in the United States. There were few
midwifery schools, and virtually no legal regulation of the practice of midwifery (or
medicine, for that matter) throughout much of American history. With midwives
tending primarily to poor, rural women who lacked ready access to doctors willing or
able to attend them, there was little motivation to outlaw midwives, who thus
practiced in most states without government control or physician resentment until
the 1900s.43
B. The Rise of Professionalized Medicine

	In the latter half of the nineteenth century, American medicine started to become
professionalized, as practitioners seeking financial reward gladly incorporated
burgeoning technology and the nineteenth-century spirit of innovation into their
practices. At roughly the same time, large segments of the American population
shifted from rural to urban settings, placing more and more pregnant women
physically within reach of doctors and hospitals. This set the stage for the ongoing,
often bitter conflict between physicians and midwives that we observe in this country
to the present day.44
By the beginning of the twentieth century, midwives attended only about half of
all births in the U.S., with physicians attending the other half. Scholars have
consistently identified economic competition, professional and institutional needs to
hospitalize birth, and gender discrimination as factors contributing to this profound
shift in maternity-care service providers.45
40. Rooks, supra note 39.
41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44. Id.
45.

See, e.g., Mainstreaming Midwives: The Politics of Change (Robbie Davis-Floyd & Christine
Barbara Johnson eds., 2006); Barbara Bridgman Perkins, The Medical Delivery Business:
Health Reform, Childbirth, and the Economic Order (Rutgers University Press, 2004);
Wagner, supra note 1.
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This shift to physician-dominated birthing attendance became ever more extreme
as the twentieth century progressed, culminating in an almost complete usurpation of
the traditional role of the midwife by doctors, and giving rise to the “pathology-oriented
medical model of childbirth” that permeates the U.S. to the present day. Major events
in this historical paradigm shift include two reports on medical education, published in
1910 and 1912, which identified significant deficiencies in American obstetrical
training and, ironically, recommended remedying the situation with the gradual
abolition of midwifery, and hospitalization for all deliveries. Rather than propose birth
at home in the company of a midwife, the reports argued that poor women should
attend charity hospitals so as to provide training opportunities for doctors.46
These influential reports—issued in a country in the throes of a love affair with
progress, technology, science, and chemistry—were followed a few years later by the
introduction of “twilight sleep” in 1914. “Twilight sleep was induced through a
combination of morphine, for relief of pain, and scopolamine, an amnesiac that
caused women to have no memories of giving birth. Upper-class women initially
welcomed twilight sleep as a symbol of medical progress, although its negative effects
were later publicized.”47 The opinion of lower-class women, recently imported into
charity hospitals as training subjects for the new medical specialty of obstetrics,
appears not to have been recorded.
Thus, the seeds for bitter conf lict were sown early in the twentieth century
between obstetricians—virtually all of them male and eager to ply their ever-growing
surgical and technological skills—and midwives, virtually all of them female, already
being marginalized by exclusion from the scientific fraternity.48
With the simultaneous destruction of traditional competition, the burgeoning of
medical technology, and the urbanization of the American population, the die was
cast for American birthing practices for the next century. The new philosophy was
articulated most famously in 1915 by noted author Dr. Joseph DeLee. In the premier
issue of the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Dr. DeLee proposed a
sequence of interventions designed to save women from the “evils natural to labor.”
The interventions included the routine use of sedatives, ether, episiotomies, and
forceps.49
46. See e.g., Rooks, supra note 39.
47.

Id.

48. According to Robbie Davis-Floyd, a leading commentator on the subject:

	Starting in the early 1900s, physicians [who were] determined to take charge of
childbirth . . . waged systematic and virulent propaganda campaigns against the
thousands of immigrant midwives practicing in the north-eastern cities, as they were
seen to be the greatest threat to physician’s [sic] attempts to take control of birth. These
campaigns employed stereo-types of midwives as dirty, illiterate, ignorant, and
irresponsible, in contrast to hospitals and physicians, which were portrayed as clean,
educated, and the epitome of responsibility in health care . . . .
Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45, at 32–33.

49. Rooks, supra note 39. Judith Rooks, author of The History of Childbearing Choices in the United States,

described Dr. DeLee as very influential:
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By 1935, midwife attendance had dropped to less than 15% of all births, as
compared to approximately half of all births in 1900. By the 1930s, midwives mostly
served black or poor, white manual laborers in the rural south. The increase in
physician attendance of births between 1915 and 1929 was accompanied by a 41%
increase in infant mortality due to birth injuries attributable to obstetrical
interference.50
	Even as American midwifery was sliding rapidly into decline due to a multitude of
pressures, nurses began a resuscitation of non-physician professionalism in American
birthing. A form of practice known as nurse-midwifery evolved in the rural south, in
part due to the work of the Frontier Nursing Service (“FNS”), an organization founded
in 1925 by Mary Breckinridge, a former public health nurse for the Red Cross in
France at the end of World War I. Ms. Breckinridge brought back from overseas the
knowledge and skills she acquired from British nurse-midwives.51
	In the mid-1950s, obstetric leaders of several inner-city teaching hospitals
recognized the potential value of nurse-midwifery in dealing with the post-war baby
boom, thus transferring the situs of most nurse-midwifery care from the home to the
hospital, and under the supervision of physicians. Nurse-midwives were influential,
in part, because they won the respect of the physician community through a required
educational process sufficiently similar to the medical-school model recognized by
doctors. Yale University School of Nursing was a leader in the field, benefiting from
the contributions of many distinguished and precedent-setting midwives. These
included Helen Varney-Burst, who not only advanced the practice of nurse-midwifery
and helped professionalize and standardize the educational requirements, but also
served as a chronicler of the profession itself.52
	Due in significant part to the increasing “medicalization” of birth, along with the
modernization of obstetrics as a lucrative medical specialty for physicians, many new
labor and delivery practices developed—many of which were “delivered in a manner

Id.

[Dr. DeLee] changed the focus of health care during labor and delivery from responding
to problems as they arose to preventing problems through routine use of interventions
to control the course of labor. This change led to medical interventions being applied
not just to the relatively small number of women who had a diagnosed problem, but
instead to every woman in labor . . . . American obstetrics is still functioning under the
medical paradigm of childbirth it inherited from Dr. DeLee.

50. Many sources document these trends. See Rooks, supra note 39. This apparent dichotomy is echoed in

present-day America, when some 95% of births are physician attended, yet the U.S. experiences one of
the highest rates of maternal and infant mortality and morbility in the industrialized world. See, e.g.,
Michael McCarthy, US Maternal Death Rates Are on the Rise, 348 Lancet 394 (1996). See generally
Wagner, supra note 1.

51.

Wagner, supra note 1. Though commencing in rural Kentucky, Ms. Breckinridge actively exported her
vision of care elsewhere, for example, to New York City, where she helped found the Lobenstine Clinic
(1930) and Lobenstine Midwifery School (1931), to formalize and professionalize nurse-midwifery
training. See, e.g., Rooks, supra note 39.

52.

See, e.g., Helen Varney Burst & Joyce E. Thompson, Genealogic Origins of Nurse-Midwifery Education
Programs in the United States, 48 J. Of Midwifery & Women’s Health 464, 464–72 (2003).
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that suited the convenience of medical professionals (mostly men).”53 In the 1950s,
“women were expected to be passive in child birth . . . . [M]others were often denied
information, restrained while in labor, and sometimes drugged and strapped. To fit
the schedules of doctors, births were often induced when not necessary; other times
they were delayed by holding patients’ legs together.”54
Coinciding with these new birthing practices, the resuscitation of American
midwifery in the nursing/hospital context faced a challenging setting in which the
contributions of nurse-midwives were especially valuable to mothers—now viewed as
“patients.” Nurse-midwives were important innovators and “humanizers” in American
obstetrics units. They re-introduced the concept of family-centered maternity care
(such as allowing fathers in the delivery room and retaining the newborn baby in the
mother’s room, rather than segregating the baby in a nursery with other newborns),
promoted childbirth education, and encouraged mothers to breastfeed in an age of
formula and sterilized bottles.55 Of course, the advent of nurse-midwifery did not
end birthing issues. The physician sub-culture of condescension toward women as
passive recipients of forced wisdom proved remarkably persistent.56
The general (albeit not universal) limitations faced by certified nurse-midwives
in the obstetric departments of hospitals left in limbo those women who wished to
resist the routine use of medical interventions utilized in hospitals.57 Non-nurse
midwives—the so-called “direct-entry midwives”—gradually filled this gap by
providing pre-natal, labor, and delivery care outside of hospitals. These services took
place either in free-standing birth centers or at-home births, typically without
supervision by ob-gyns or other physicians. This lay-midwifery/home-birth
movement developed during the 1960s and 1970s as part of “a grassroots effort by
women to reclaim power over their own bodies and births.”58 It involved primarily a
small number of well-educated, middle-class, white women opting for home births,
as well as even smaller numbers of limited populations of women with specific
religious or sub-cultural reasons for selecting home-delivery, such as Mormons and
certain Native American groups.
	In 2003, direct-entry midwives attended four of every thousand U.S. births and
almost five of every thousand vaginal births (non-cesarean). Today, the majority of
women who choose home birth are professional, white, and middle class, along with
53.

Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons From Medical Consumerism and the
Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 Am. J. L. & Med. 147, 158 (1994).

54. Id.
55.

Rooks, supra note 39.

56. According to a 1979 medical textbook on obstetrics and gynecology: “The evaluation of the patient’s

personality need not be a lengthy matter . . . . Character traits are expressed in her walk, her dress, her
makeup . . . . The observant physician can quickly make a judgment as to whether she is overcompliant,
overdemanding, aggressive, passive, erotic, or infantile.” J. Robert Willson et al., Obstetrics and
Gynecology 51 (6th ed. 1979).

57.

See generally Rooks, supra note 39. See also Wagner, supra note 1, at 99–125.

58. Rooks, supra note 39.
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a significant minority of poor and working-class women who consistently choose
home birth.59 Even so, the vast majority of women in the United States give birth in
hospitals, attended by ob-gyns; that is, by surgeons, whose training necessarily
encompasses surgery as a standard weapon in the arsenal against the “pathology” of
birth.60
Many people assume that doctor-provided care is safer than that provided by
other practitioners. In reality, the U.S. consistently displays one of the highest
medical-error rates in the industrialized world. A study conducted in 2000 concluded
that medical error in the United States results in between 44,000–98,000 unnecessary
deaths in hospitals each year and 1,000,000 excess injuries.61
Though nearly all American women deliver their babies in hospitals with
surgeon-physicians in attendance, twenty-eight countries have a lower maternal
mortality rate. And for more than twenty-five years, the number of American women
dying around the time of childbirth has been increasing—by one thousand per
year—and half of these deaths are believed to have been preventable.62 If this reality
is merely a reflection of the informed choice of individuals, no human rights issue is
presented, even if medically guided births are no safer than others. On the other
hand, if the majority of women choose physician-attended hospital births due to
misinformation about the clinical situation and birthing options, as well as an undue
restriction of alternative services, their rights are violated and a remedy is necessary.
III. The Rise and risk of Surgical Birth

The surgical removal of a baby from the womb of its mother is
an act that exudes deep philosophical and cultural conflict.63
A. A Brief History of the C-section

	Although the matter is not entirely without dispute, it is generally believed that
an edict of the Caesars of Imperial Rome (Lex Caesarea) gave rise to the term
“cesarean section.” This ancient law provided that “any pregnant woman dying at or
near term was to be delivered by C-section,” that is, the surgical delivery of a fetus.
Mothers expected to survive the delivery were not, however, to be sacrificed for the
59.

Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45, at 22.

60. See, e.g., Gary H. Lipscomb et al., Senior Obstetric-Gynecologic Residents’ Perceptions of Their Surgical

Training, Experiences and Skill, 38 J. Reprod. Med. 871 (1993) (discussing senior obstetric and
gynecologic residents’ self-perceptions of surgical skill and arguing a need for comprehensive reevaluation
of the components of gynecologic surgical curricula).

61.

Saul N. Weingart et al., Epidemiology of Medical Error, Brit. Med. J., Mar. 18, 2000, at 774–77, available
at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1117772.

62. Wagner, supra note 1, at 9. Dr. Wagner also notes that forty-one countries have lower infant-mortality

rates than the U.S. Id.

63. Myers, supra note 5, at 535.
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welfare of the fetus.64 Thus, the legal origins of modern cesarean section are rooted
in surgical removal of a fetus from a dying mother only.65
	Ironically, in twentieth-century America, where increasingly sophisticated
medical technology was within grasp of the surgeons who came to dominate
maternity care, this surgical procedure came to be used—and aggressively
promoted—in regard to healthy mothers. The C-section was transformed from an
effort to salvage a living infant from a dying mother to a routine procedure to
surgically remove a fetus from a woman with a future.
	A cesarean section constitutes major surgery.66 The doctor—a surgeon—
administers an anesthetic, drains the woman’s bladder, scrubs her skin, opens the
abdomen using a low “bikini” incision, peels the bladder away from the uterus, cuts
through the uterine wall, and removes the fetus. The surgeon typically hands off the
baby immediately to another physician or advanced-training nurse to care for, then
removes the placenta, sews the bladder back into place, and closes the incision with
six or seven layers of stitching.67
Overall, without differentiation for high-risk individuals, the C-section procedure
is two to twelve times more likely to result in maternal death than vaginal delivery.68
Even physician sources, which might be suspected of being apologists for the practice,
concede the higher risk of complications from C-sections as compared to vaginal
delivery.69 The C-section, as a major surgical procedure, also typically requires a
longer recovery period. Most mothers spend an average of four days in the hospital
recovering from the surgery.70 Common maternal complications include: infection,
heavy blood loss, blood clot in a vein, nausea, vomiting, and severe headache postdelivery attributable to anesthesia and abdominal procedure.71 In addition, many
women feel weakened from the impact of the anesthesia and surgical stress for weeks

64. See e.g., Mark Israel, Caesarean Section, http://alt-usage-english.org/excerpts/fxcaesar.html (last visited

Oct. 10, 2009). See also Benjamin P. Sachs, Vaginal Birth After Cesarean: A Health Policy Perspective, 44
Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 553, 553–60 (2001) (discussing the history of caesareans and
their current use).

65.

Sachs, supra note 64, at 553–60. See also Christopher Norwood, How to Avoid a Cesarean
Section 21 (Simon and Schuster 1984).

66. Bruce L. Flamm, Birth After Cesarean: The Medical Facts 17 (Prentice Hall Press 1990).
67.

Norwood, supra note 65, at 20–21.

68. See, e.g., Lorna McBarnette, Women and Poverty: The Effects on Reproductive Status, 12 Women &

Health 55, 72 (1988).

69. Id.
70. Norwood, supra note 65, at 21.
71.

T.F. Porter & James R. Scott, Cesarean Delivery, in Danforth’s Obstetrics and Gynecology 499,
450–51 (James R. Scott et al. eds., Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 9th ed. 2003). See also F.G.
Cunningham et al. Williams Obstetrics 592 (Andrea Seals et al. eds., McGraw-Hill 22d ed.
2005); Norwood, supra note 65, at 21–23; Cesarean Sections—Risks and Complications, http://www.
webmd.com/baby/tc/cesarean-section-risks-and-complications (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
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or months after they go home.72 Nearly all of these women will experience depression,
discomfort, and infections.73
These are merely the short-term risks. The long-term risks associated with
cesarean sections, which increase with each additional C-section, include uterine
rupture during a subsequent pregnancy, placenta previa, and the growth of the
placenta either lower in the uterus and/or deeper into the uterine wall than normal—
all of which can lead to severe bleeding after childbirth, sometimes requiring a
hysterectomy.74
Cesarean sections also pose risks for the infant, including injury during delivery,
special-care requirements in neonatal intensive care units, and lung immaturity if the
due date was miscalculated or delivery occurred prior to thirty-nine weeks of
gestation.75
	Simply put, it takes more time and special care to heal from a cesarean section.
Overall, it requires about a third more hospital time, and three to four times as many
weeks for recovery.76
B. The Expanding Popularity of C-sections in the United States

The cesarean section is the second most prevalent surgical procedure in the
United States. At just over one million in 2002,77 this is an unacceptably high rate,
especially given the official health policy in place aimed at reducing this rate.78 The
American C-section rate has long been one of the highest in the world.79 A complex
interaction of conservative physician culture, financial incentives, technological
availability, fear of medical malpractice liability, judicial reluctance to address the
issue, and the absence of legislation contribute to the particularly high rate.80
	In 1980, the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development held a
Consensus Development Conference on Cesarean Childbirth to analyze the thenrecord-high American cesarean birth rate of 15%. The report they later issued
72. Norwood, supra note 65, at 21.
73. Id. at 23.
74.

Id. See also Porter, supra note 71, at 450–51.

75. Toril Kolås et al., Planned Cesarean Versus Planned Vaginal Delivery at Term: Comparison of Newborn

Infant Outcomes, 195 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 1538, 1541–43 (2006).

76. Cesarean Sections—Risks and Complications, http://www.webmd.com/baby/tc/cesarean-section-risks-

and-complications (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).

77.

Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2002, Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep., Dec. 17, 2003, at 1, 82,
available at http://www.nber.org/natality/2002/docs/FinalRpt.pdf (reporting births by method of
delivery: 2,958,423 vaginal deliveries, 634,426 primary cesareans, 409,420 repeat cesareans, for a
national cesarean delivery rate of 26.1%).

78. See Healthy People 2000, supra note 2; Cesarean Childbirth, supra note 2.
79. See, e.g., Notzon, supra note 2, at 3287.
80. See, e.g., Kelly F. Bates, Cesarean Section Epidemic: Defining the Problem-Approaching Solutions, 4 B.U.

Pub. Int. L.J. 389, 396–406 (1995).
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lamented the 15% rate and called for a reduction.81 Notwithstanding this clarion call,
the rate actually rose to approximately 25% in 1986, one of the highest levels ever
reported in the United States.82 Some ten years later, nearly half of American
C-sections were found to be medically unnecessary. In 1990, out of the 982,000
cesareans performed in the United States, 480,520 procedures were found
unnecessary.83 Thus, the problem of a persistent, excessive number of C-sections was
compounded by the needlessness of half of them.
The U.S. cesarean rate increased from 5.5% in 1970 to 26.1% in 2002, the highest
rate ever reported in the United States.84 The World Health Organization says there
is no justification for any region in the world to have a cesarean rate more than 10 to
15%.85 Currently, “the United States ranks behind no fewer than forty other nations
in preventing maternal deaths.”86 In fact, in recent years, the death rate in the U.S.
has steadily been on the rise, averaging 7.5 deaths per 100,000 births in 1982, 13.2
deaths per 100,000 births in 2004, and 15.1 deaths per 100,000 births in 2005.87
The level of concern over the C-section rate is mounting, fed in part by
performance of surgeries that are either against the wishes of the mother or
unnecessary from a medical point of view.88 Questions have also arisen as to a possible
link between the C-section rate in the United States, including forced C-sections,
and the economic and racial characteristics of its recipients. A national study found
that approximately 80% of the patients who received court-ordered cesarean sections
were African-American, African, Asian, or Latina.89 In particular, nearly half of the
court-ordered C-sections, transfusions, and hospital detentions for pregnant women
were directed against African American women.90 Nearly half of the women were
unmarried, and almost one-fourth did not speak English as their primary language.91
81.

See Cesarean Childbirth, supra note 2.

82. See Rodwin, supra note 53, at 150.
83. Bates, supra note 80, at n.16.
84. Cesarean Childbirth, supra note 2; Brady E. Hamilton, Births: Preliminary Data for 2002, Nat’l Vital

Stat. Rep., Jun. 25, 2003, at 1, 4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_11.pdf.

85. See Citizens for Midwifery, Cesarean Rate Rises to Highest Ever Reported in the United States—26.1%,

http://www.cfmidwifery.org/pdf/NationalStatistics2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).

86. Ina May Gaskin, Maternal Death in the United States: A Problem Solved or a Problem Ignored?, J. of

Perinatal Educ., Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.inamay.com/view_article.php?Article_
ID=44&page_number=1.

87.

Id.

88. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (a pregnant woman

was taken to court by state officials in Illinois to challenge her rejection of a C-section on religious
grounds. Both the trial court and appellate court upheld her right to make this choice). See also Don
Terry, Legal Fight Over Caesarean Pits Mother Against Fetus, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1993, at A22.

89. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 New. Eng. J. Med. 1192 (1987).
90. Id. at 1194. This figure does not include African women, who were counted along with Asians as

representing 33% of those receiving forced cesareans.

91.

Id. at 1198.
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The same study revealed that 46% of the directors of fellowship programs in maternal
and fetal medicine believed that mothers who refused medical advice when their
fetuses were “in danger” required detention in hospitals or other facilities until
compliance with the advice could be obtained. In a particularly telling and chilling
response, approximately one-quarter of these directors supported state surveillance of
women in the third trimester of pregnancy.92
	American research consistently suggests that the effort to reduce growing
C-section rates is more a process of changing physician behavior than of medical
education or clinical need.93 Doctors perform unneeded and unwanted cesarean
sections.94 Overall, without differentiation for specific high-risk populations, “[c]
esarean births usually present greater risk than vaginal births for women, cost more,
and often leave women far less satisfied.”95
C. The Problem and Precedent of Forced C-sections

	Subjective factors such as cultural ideology and fetal protectionist beliefs may
influence doctors to perform forced cesarean sections. For instance, some doctors
express hostility toward women who refuse a cesarean section based on cultural or
religious values.96 Some doctors view these women as irresponsible, irrational, callous,
or insufficiently caring for their children.97

92.

Id. at 1195. According to data from this study:

Court orders have been obtained for cesarean sections in 11 states, for hospital
detentions in 2 states, and for intrauterine transfusions in 1 state. Among 21 cases in
which court orders were sought, the orders were obtained in 86 percent; in 88 percent of
those cases, the orders were received within six hours . . . . All the women were treated
in a teaching-hospital clinic or were receiving public assistance. No important maternal
morbidity or mortality was reported . . . . We conclude from these data that courtordered obstetrical procedures represent an important and growing problem that evokes
sharply divided responses from faculty members in obstetrics. Such procedures are
based on dubious legal grounds, and they may have far-reaching implications for
obstetrical practice and maternal and infant health.

Id. at 1192.
93.

See e.g., Elliott K. Main, Reducing Cesarean Birth Rates with Data-driven Quality Improvement Activities,
103 Pediatrics (No. 1 Supp.) 374, 374 (1999).

94. See Ingrid Van Tuinen & Sidney M. Wolfe, Unnecessary Cesarean Sections: Halting a

National Epidemic (Public Citizen’s Health Research Group 1992); Carol Sakala, Medically
Unnecessary Cesarean Births: Introduction to a Symposium, 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1177 (1993); Carol Sakala,
Midwifery Care and Out-of-Hospital Birth Settings: How Do They Reduce Unnecessary Cesarean Section
Births?, 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1233 (1993); Too Many Cesareans, Consumer Reps., Feb. 1991, at 120.

95. Rodwin supra note 53, at 158.
96. See, e.g., Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women’s Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on

Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 523, 532 (1991).

97.

Id.
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	In one case, for example, doctors forcibly restrained a Nigerian woman to her hospital
bed because she opposed a cesarean section.98 The doctors removed the woman’s husband
from the delivery room, bound the woman’s ankles and wrists in leather cuffs, and
performed the forced surgery on her.99 In another case, doctors characterized a Bedouin
woman—who rejected the procedure because she feared she would die if operated on—as
ignorant and incapable of arriving at an intelligent decision.100
“The complex problem of physicians performing forced and unnecessary cesarean
sections on pregnant women has generated national concern.”101 Early case law gave
short shrift to the rights of the parents to refuse surgical intervention, even on
religious grounds. From 1981 to 1986, fifteen court orders were sought in the United
States to authorize cesarean sections against women who refused them, of which
thirteen were granted.102 In several cases involving pregnant women who have refused
surgery in violation of a court order, the women delivered healthy babies through
natural childbirth.103
The terse 1981 opinion from Georgia, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority, illustrates the problem.104 Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson opposed the surgical
delivery of their unborn child on religious grounds, but their wishes were overridden
by orders of the Superior and Juvenile Courts in Butts County.105 The orders
authorized the plaintiff hospital to perform a cesarean section on the mother for the
delivery of her unborn child, and awarded temporary custody of the unborn child to
the State Department of Human Resources.106 A hospital physician allegedly found
that the mother had a condition in her pregnancy—a complete placenta previa—such
that the unborn child would not survive a vaginal delivery, but would almost certainly
live if delivered by caesarean section prior to the beginning of labor. The fetus was
viable and fully capable of sustaining life independent of the mother.107 The trial
courts upheld the orders, awarding the state temporary custody of the unborn child
and ordering the mother to submit to the cesarean section.108
98. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women’s

L.J. 9, 9–10 (1987).

99. Id.
100. Krauss, supra note 96, at 532.
101. Bates, supra note 80, at 389.
102. Michael Phillips, Maternal Rights v. Fetal Rights: Court-Ordered Cesareans, 56 Mo. L. Rev. 411 (1991).
103. See, e.g., Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Jefferson v. Griffin

Spalding County Hospital Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). Physician predictions of fetal harm
are often incorrect. Id. See also George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of
All, in Hastings Center Report, June 1982, at 15–16.

104. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
105. Id. at 459–60.
106. Id. at 459.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 460.
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This startling issue only rarely percolates to the surface of the law. Many forced
C-sections go unreported.109 According to one scholar, “[t]he problem of coerced
cesarean sections has not received the public attention and social commentary it
deserves because of the lack of written decisions.”110
	In the 1990s, the judicial temperament seems slowly to have cooled toward tying
pregnant women down and cutting them open. For example, in Doe v. Doe, the State
of Illinois attempted to override a pregnant woman’s decision to refuse a cesarean
section.111 A doctor for the hospital claimed that without the surgery, the baby might
“be born dead or severely retarded.”112 The trial court ruled that the state could not
force the woman to submit to a C-section, and the Illinois Appellate Court
unanimously affirmed.113 Not long after the court’s decision, the woman delivered a
healthy baby boy through natural childbirth.114 The Illinois decision is overtly
pedagogical, and merits quoting at some length:
Both the State and the Public Guardian argued that the circuit court should
have balanced the rights of the unborn but viable fetus which was nearly at
full term and which, if the uncontradicted expert testimony of the physicians
had been accurate, would have been born dead or severely retarded if Doe
delivered vaginally, against the right of the competent woman to choose the
type of medical care she deemed appropriate, based in part on personal
religious considerations. We hold today that Illinois courts should not engage
in such a balancing, and that a woman’s competent choice in refusing medical
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during her pregnancy must be
honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.

[A] woman’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her
rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during
pregnancy. The woman retains the same right to refuse invasive treatment,
even of lifesaving or other beneficial nature, that she can exercise when she is
not pregnant. The potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant; to
the contrary, the [Illinois Supreme Court in Stallman v. Youngquist] (citation
omitted) explicitly rejected the view that the woman’s rights can be
subordinated to fetal rights . . . . A woman is under no duty to guarantee the
mental and physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be compelled
to do or not do anything merely for the benefit of her unborn child.115
109. Bates, supra note 80, at 413 n.95.
110. Id.
111. Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
112. Id. at 327.
113. Id.; see also Terry, supra note 88, at A22.
114. Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 329.
115. Id. at 397, 401 (emphasis added). The Illinois Appellate Court relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme

Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medical procedures).
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Four years before the Baby Boy Doe case, the Supreme Court determined in a
non-C-section case that the Fourteenth Amendment stood for the principle that “a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment.”116 The Court had the opportunity to review (and
therefore reverse) the Illinois ruling (holding that a woman’s right to refuse treatment
was not diminished by pregnancy), but declined to do so.117
	Similarly, in the case of In re A.C., a physician at George Washington University
Hospital in the District of Columbia decreed to Angela Carder, a dying cancer
patient, that if she did not have a cesarean section, her health and her baby’s life
would be seriously endangered. 118 The hospital sought a declaratory order from the
Superior Court to determine whether it should proceed with the procedure to save
the life of the fetus.119 After a three-hour hearing in Carder’s hospital room, the trial
court ordered the performance of a cesarean section.120 Carder refused. The doctor
performed the surgery over his patient’s objection.121 Mrs. Carder and her baby died
shortly after the procedure.122 The appellate court then granted a petition for a
rehearing, vacated the trial court’s order, and held that a physician should defer to a
competent pregnant woman’s decision to accept or reject a cesarean section
operation.123 The court noted with great emphasis that “it would be an extraordinary
case indeed in which a court might ever be justified in overriding the patient’s wishes
and authorizing a major surgical procedure such as a caesarean section.”124 The case
was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
	Although these cases illustrate an initial regard for upholding a pregnant woman’s
decision to accept or reject a cesarean section, the social climate would again cool
toward the rights of pregnant women as America’s conf licted attitude toward
C-sections persisted into the new millennium.
D. Negative Attitudes Toward the Rights of Pregnant Women

	In 2004, some ten years after Baby Boy Doe was decided, the State of Utah charged
Melissa Rowland with the murder of her stillborn fetus.125 Utah claimed that the
116. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
117. Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1168 (1994).
118. 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1237.
124. Id. at 1252.
125. Howard Minkoff & Lynn M. Paltrow, Melissa Rowland and the Rights of Pregnant Women, 104

Obstetrics & Gynecology 1234, 1234 (2004). Ms. Rowland ultimately avoided the homicide charge
by pleading guilty to lesser child endangerment charges. Id.
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death resulted from Ms. Rowland’s rejection of the advice of her physicians to deliver
her twins surgically.126 According to commentators at New York’s National Advocates
for Pregnant Women, “the approach taken by the State raises important and troubling
issues regarding the autonomy rights of pregnant women, as well as their right to speak
on behalf [of] their unborn children.”127 The commentators further concluded that:
[I]f Ms. Rowland is to be judged legally culpable for the death of her fetus, then
the courts must first create a new and significant exception to the doctrine of
informed consent . . . . Such a precedent could introduce a substantial disparity
between the rights of pregnant women and those of all other persons.128

	At the other end of the spectrum, the National Review published a remarkably
mean-spirited commentary making light of Ms. Rowland’s plight. In a piece by
Jennifer Graham entitled Give Me a “C”! Bed rest, doting nurses, epidurals . . . what’s
not to like?, Ms. Graham opined about Ms. Rowland:
We can only speculate as to what Melissa Ann Rowland was thinking when
she said—allegedly, of course—that having a Caesarean section to save the
lives of her twins would “ruin her life.” Was she about to embark on a new
career as a Penthouse pet? Model swimsuits for Sports Illustrated? . . . Now, no
one wants to see a woman who just gave birth sitting in jail when she should
be home nursing the surviving infant—assuming, of course, that breastfeeding
wouldn’t ruin her life.129

Ms. Graham’s caustic humor at the expense of women undergoing major surgery
they don’t want is hardly original. In a telling display of what many surgeons find
funny, the humor magazine Journal of Irreproducible Results—which solicits articles
that appeal to scientists, doctors, and engineers130 —published a bogus research study
summary entitled, “The Reciprocal Natural Childbirth Index.”131 The Index, posted
in at least one Ivy League medical school,132 added “points” to a woman’s made-up
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Jennifer Graham, Give Me a “C”! Bed rest, doting nurses, epidurals . . . what’s not to like?, National

Review, Mar. 16, 2004, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/jgraham/graham200403160901.
asp. Ms. Graham continued:

Id.

But let’s assume, just for the heck of it, that Rowland wasn’t just concerned about how
fetching her naked body would look to future suitors. What if she really did fear
surgery? Even with the C-section rate exceeding 25 percent nationwide, driven upward
in part by women who would rather not labor, the worry warts insist on calling it “Major
Surgery,” and sure, there are some risks. But as Major Surgery goes, a C-section—
without complications, and with a good insurer—is a pretty good deal.

130. Journal of Irreproducible Results Home Page, http://www.jir.com/home.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
131. For a discussion of the Index, see Wagner, supra note 1, at 19.
132. Id. (citing A. Berg, The Reciprocal Natural Childbirth Index, Journal of Irreproducible Results, 36

Mar.–Apr. 1991, at 27).
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“childbirth services score” if: she or another person checks her cervix prior to arrival
at the hospital; she or her husband has a hyphenated last name; she has more than
four years of college; she has a written birth plan; she is insured by a managed
healthcare plan; and other rollicking factors.133 Concludes the author:
We have found that a Reciprocal Natural Childbirth Index score of 30 or
greater should earn the woman in labor immediate consideration for cesarean
section. In fact, since you can get a score of 30 without even being in labor,
someone with a high enough score could be offered a C-section at her
convenience during regular working hours.134

Ms. Rowland is not alone in being deemed a criminal for her maternity conduct.
Certain states in the U.S. have, in recent years, pursued increasingly aggressive
prosecution of pregnant women who are deemed to have failed at pre-natal care. A
prime example is South Carolina, whose supreme court has applied a state statute
punishing child abuse to fetal health, upholding a murder conviction arising from a
stillbirth to a mother who had taken cocaine during her pregnancy.135 The jury was
unable to return a verdict, so the prosecution re-brought the action and, on round
two, won a conviction.136 South Carolina is the only state where the courts have
included viable fetuses within the scope of child abuse laws in an attempt to prosecute
pregnant women. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter.137
Meanwhile, an American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”)
publication asks: “Should refusal to undergo a cesarean delivery be a criminal offense”?138
IV. The Human Rights AND ANTI-TRUST Implications of PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS THAT PREVENT VAGINAL BIRTHS AFTER C-SECTIONS

A. Brief Overview of ACOG

The organization that claims to be the “nation’s leading authority on women’s
health for more than 50 years”139 is the American College of Obstetricians and
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (S.C. 2003). The state court observed:

The drug “cocaine” has torn at the very fabric of our nation. Families have been ripped
apart, minds have been ruined, and lives have been lost . . . . The addictive nature of the
drug, combined with its expense, has caused our prisons to swell with those who have
been motivated to support their drug habit through criminal acts. In some areas of the
world, entire governments have been undermined by the cocaine industry.

Id. (citing State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990).
136. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
137. Id. at 168, 540 U.S. 819.

138. Richard L. Berkowitz, Should Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Delivery Be a Criminal Offense? 104

Obstetrics & Gynecology 1220 (2004).

139. ACOG Fact Sheet, http://www.acog.org/from_home/ACOGFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,

2009).
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Gynecologists (“ACOG”). ACOG boasts a membership that includes more than
90% of all American board-certified ob-gyns, and is the self-described voice of
women’s health.140 It sets the standards for obstetrical practice in this country, in
large part, because of its members’ belief that “failure to comply with the ACOG
recommendations will increase medical legal risks should a poor outcome be
experienced.”141 Its members testify before U.S. congressional committees on the
formulation of public policy.142 Its practice standards govern not only dispensation of
services to women, but also influence whether a service will be covered by health
insurance. Insurance companies routinely monitor changes in ACOG policies to
adjust their coverage accordingly.143
Membership in ACOG is limited to obstetrician-gynecologists. It is, in fact, a
trade association:
ACOG is not a college in the sense of an institution of higher learning, nor is
it a scientific body. It is a “professional organization” that in reality is one
kind of trade union. Like every trade union, ACOG has two goals: promote
the interests of its members, and promote a better product (in this case, wellbeing of women).144

One-third of all cesareans are performed on women who have had at least one
cesarean in the past.145 This reflects the traditional American physician’s wisdom:
“once a cesarean, always a cesarean.”146 Yet, there are many women who, having
delivered surgically in the past, wish to deliver vaginally. These women are designated
as “VBACs”—vaginal birth after cesarean.
Many hospitals mandate that any pregnant patient who has previously undergone
uterine surgery (including a C-section) must deliver surgically if the delivery is to
take place on hospital premises. Dr. Marsden Wagner, M.D., a perinatal
epidemiologist and former Director of the European Regional Office of the Women
and Children’s Health for the World Health Organization, has called this trend in
140. Id.
141. Robert D’Angelo, Comment On “Neonatal Morbidity Associated with Uterine Rupture: What Are the Risk

Factors?” by Emmanuel Bujold, Obstetric Anesthesia Digest, Sept. 2002, at 132.

142. See, e.g., Who Will Deliver America’s Babies? The Impact of Excessive Litigation: Hearing Before the Comm. on

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/72nd/
Exhibits/Senate/JUD/SJUD3041C.pdf (testimony of Shelby L. Wilbourne on behalf of ACOG).

143. See, e.g., Premier AEIX Risk E-lert Newsletter, ACOG updates labor and delivery best practices, Jan. 13,

2006, available at http://www.premierinc.com/risk/education-newsletters/risk-e-lert/2006/January06.
jsp; Aetna, Clinical Policy Bulletin: Home Births, Policy No. 0329, Review Date June 26, 2007, available
at http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical/data/300_399/0329.html.

144. Marsden Wagner, What Every Midwife Should Know About ACOG and VBAC: Critique of ACOG Practice

Bulletin No. 5, July 1999, “Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Section,” available at http://www.
midwiferytoday.com/articles/acog.asp.

145. See, e.g., The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Practice Bulletin No. 5, Vaginal

Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery (1999) [hereinafter ACOG Practice Bulletin #5].

146. See, e.g., Bruce L. Flamm, Once A Cesarean, Always A Controversy, 90 Obstetrics & Gynecology 312

(1997).
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American hospitals a “widespread failure to honor the rights of pregnant and birthing
women.”147
For purposes of the instant paper, the question is not whether VBAC is desirable
from a medical point of view. Analysis of the merits of any given medical decision to
assist or deny VBAC is beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this work is the
identification and analysis of non-medical motivations in the formulation of clinical
recommendations for or against surgical intervention in the birth process, specifically,
a cesarean section for a woman who has previously delivered surgically but wishes to
deliver vaginally in a subsequent pregnancy.
That is, does the formulation of clinical standards and recommendations in favor
of surgical delivery for women who have delivered surgically before, based in part on
non-clinical considerations such as financial reward and potential legal liability,
violate the rights of pregnant women who may wish to refuse surgical intervention in
the birthing process if they were fully informed?
B. ACOG’s Influence on VBACs for Non-Medical Reasons

	ACOG acknowledges the impropriety of basing patient health recommendations
on financial considerations. According to the ACOG Code of Ethics, “the welfare of
the patient must form the basis of all medical judgments.” It describes the “right of
individual patients to make their own choices about their health care” as
“fundamental,” and specifically identifies financial constraints as a conflict of interest
that must be disclosed to the patient.148
ACOG does not dispute that VBAC is safe: “Over the past 30 years, more than 50
studies have documented the safety of VBAC.”149 For years, ACOG has acknowledged
both the “strong consensus that trial of labor is appropriate for most women” with a
history of C-section, and the general agreement that the U.S. C-section rate is high.150
	However, there is substantial evidence that standards promulgated by ACOG
have the effect of restricting access to medical and non-medical services in support of
VBAC. Such restrictions reflect, inter alia, provider and/or hospital considerations
and liability concerns and not simply the best judgment for the health of the mothers
and babies involved.
	In 1997, ACOG published an article by a member physician that stated frankly:
“For the physician, elective repeat cesareans offer advantages, including convenience,
time savings, and sometimes increased compensation.”151 Two years later, ACOG
147. Wagner, supra note 1, at 178.
148. Code of Professional Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Jan. 2008,

available at www.acog.org/from_home/acogcode.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).

149. Flamm, supra note 146, at 313.
150. ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, supra note 145, at 1. Of course, repeat C-sections may be indicated for

clinical reasons in the case of any particular individual patient. The question under discussion is whether
ACOG discourages VBAC deliveries for non-medical reasons.

151. Flamm, supra note 146, at 313.
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noted that one-third of all C-sections were performed on patients who had previously
delivered surgically.152 ACOG expressly related the increased C-section rate to the
“increased medical-legal pressures” faced by American physicians arising from claims
related to fetal morbidity and mortality, and admitted at the same time that the
increase in C-sections as a reaction to those claims had not proven to be an
improvement in terms of newborn outcome.153
	Indeed, ACOG reminded its membership that complications arising from any
unsuccessful trial of labor have increasingly “led to malpractice suits” whether or not
a VBAC was involved. Thus, reducing the number of VBACs by restricting their
availability was a way to reduce the overall number of trials of labor, which in turn
decreased the specter of legal liability for malpractice.154
	It was this desire to limit members’ liability that led ACOG to acknowledge a
“need to reevaluate VBAC recommendations.”155 One of the sources cited by ACOG
in its reevaluation was entitled, “Characteristics of successful claims for payment by the
Florida Neurologic Injury Compensation Association Fund,” another ACOG
publication.156 Not surprisingly, the “reevaluated” VBAC recommendations portended
a decrease in VBACs, essentially limiting them to major regional hospitals that could
supply the extensive battery of high-tech equipment and personnel required under
the new guidelines.157
The practice guidelines set forth in ACOG’s Practice Bulletin #5 established
severe restrictions on the practical availability of professional services to women
seeking a VBAC, despite the acknowledged absence of scientific evidence supporting
the recommendation: “VBAC should be attempted in institutions equipped to
respond to emergencies with physicians immediately available to provide emergency
care.”158 It further recommended that the decision to proceed with a VBAC be made
not by the “patient” herself, but rather by “the patient and her physician,”159 despite
152. ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, supra note 145, at 1.
153. Id.
154. See David J. Birnbach, Obstetrical Anesthesia: Reaffirming Our Commitment to Safety and Comfort, Am.

Soc’y of Anesthesiologists Newsl., July 2003, available at http://w w w.asahq.org/
Newsletters/2003/07_03/whatsNew07_03.html.

155. ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, supra note 145, at 2.
156. B.L. Stalnaker et al., Characteristics of Successful Claims for Payment by the Florida Neurologic Injury

Compensation Association Fund, 177 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 268 (1997).

157. ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, supra note 145.
158. Id. at 5. ACOG Vice-President of Practice Activities, Stanley Zinberg, M.D., in noting the small risk of

uterine rupture in a VBAC woman, asserted to fellow professionals that VBAC services are “often
accompanied by legal action no matter what the clinical outcome or how excellent the clinical care.”
However, Dr. Zinberg notes that although ACOG “recognizes the implications such immediate availability
[requirement] has . . . for the practice patterns of obstetricians and anesthesiologists and for the incidence
of VBAC in general,” defendant physicians and hospitals are “in a better position from a liability perspective
if the physicians were present at the time of the complication.” Birnbach, supra note 154.

159. Id.
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the ethical prescription for the fundamental right of individual patients to make their
own choices about their healthcare.
	ACOG’s Practice Bulletin #5 is billed as part of the “clinical management guidelines
for obstetrician-gynecologists,”160 presumably rendering it subject to ACOG’s ethical
maxim that such decisions must be based on patient welfare, and not on conflicting
financial constraints. Yet, the bulletin text itself expressly manifests the non-clinical
factors at play including increased costs to the hospital, increased costs to the physician,
and medical malpractice payments. “The difficulty in assessing the cost benefit of
[restricting] VBAC[s] is that the costs are not all incurred by one entity.”161
	According to ACOG’s practice ethics, however, there is only one entity whose
welfare governs clinical judgments: the patient.162 Yet the clinical guidelines proffered
by ACOG to its member physicians expressly consider lawsuits, medical malpractice
payments, compensation rates, as well as hospital and physician costs. One is left
wondering: “Is this good medicine or just a misguided attempt at risk
management?”163
	In 2004, ACOG replaced Practice Bulletin #5 with Practice Bulletin #54.
ACOG had apparently learned something from the controversy generated by its
candor in 1999: its previously frank references to “malpractice suits” were omitted.164
Nonetheless, the key restrictive provision functionally limiting the availability of
VBAC services was carried forward and remains in effect to the present day: “VBAC
should be attempted in institutions equipped to respond to emergencies with
physicians immediately available to provide emergency care.”165 This language is a
direct carry-over from the 1999 Bulletin, and had been previously criticized for its
adverse impact on the availability of VBAC services. One commentator notes that
Practice Bulletin #54 “has a huge impact on the system of maternity care in the
United States” by “drastically reduc[ing] or eliminate[ing] several options available to
women with previous cesarean section, including having their birth at home, in a
freestanding birth center or in a small community hospital.” 166 Another medical
commentator notes that the phrase “immediately available” has “significant
implications for both anesthesia and obstetric care providers whose practices have
been based on a home call system.”167 As the guidelines require that physicians remain
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
162. Conflicts between the welfare of the mother giving birth and the baby and/or fetus are beyond the

scope of this paper. For purposes of the issue at hand, it is safe to assume that the discussion is limited
to those instances where the interests of the mother and the fetus or newborn are in alignment.

163. Flamm, supra note 146, at 315.
164. The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Practice Bulletin No. 54, Vaginal Birth

After Previous Cesarean Delivery (2004).

165. Id. at 6.
166. Wagner, supra note 144.
167. D’Angelo, supra note 141, at 132.
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immediately available, “no longer is it simply enough to make the incision within 30
minutes of the decision for a cesarean section.”168 The commentator notes further that
altering such practices simply may not be feasible in many rural practices.169
Ulterior financial motives are also at play in the “reevaluated” ACOG standards.
One commentator notes: “ACOG’s primary allegiance to the needs of its members
over the needs of women . . . requires their recommendations to be suspect unless
confirmed by overwhelming scientific evidence . . . . [Such] recommendations . . .
should never be the sole basis, nor even the most important justification, for maternity
care policy in the United States.”170
C. Independent Researchers Acknowledge the ACOG Problem

Researchers from different disciplines are in accord with ACOG’s own admissions
on its role in the restriction of VBAC services and availability. For example,
economists at Tulane University have written: “Theoretical and empirical studies
suggest that risk of malpractice lawsuits encourages physicians to practice ‘defensive
medicine,’ utilization of medical resources beyond its optimal level of use . . . . Results
suggest that a higher degree of malpractice risk increases the probability of C-section
delivery.”171
	A disturbing study released in 2001 identified a number of non-clinical factors as
affecting physician choice to deliver surgically.172 In an effort to elucidate which
factors were most important in deciding the birth mode, the study examined
obstetricians’ reasoning when deciding whether or not to perform cesarean sections.
The authors of the study identified forty-two birthing predictor variables, which
were divided into three categories: (1) maternal clinical characteristics present at the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Wagner, supra note 144.
171. Dhankhar, P. et al., Threat of Malpractice Lawsuit, Physician Behavior and Health Outcomes: Testing the

Presence of Defensive Medicine, Annual Meeting Paper, American Economic Association (2005), available
at http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2005/0107_0800_1213.pdf (dividing data into two
groups, necessary C-sections and unnecessary C-sections). One doctor describes it this way:
Many physicians earnestly want to avoid unnecessary repeat cesarean operations but
fear that they will be found legally liable if any untoward event occurs during a trial of
labor . . . . [A]t least one major medical malpractice insurance company (Cooperative of
American Physician, Inc., Mutual Protection Trust) already has mailed a modification
of [the VBAC] consent form . . . . No risks for elective repeat cesarean are listed . . . .
Widespread implementation of this or similar consent forms essentially would mean
the end of VBAC . . . . On a national level, giving up VBAC would mean performing
an additional 100,000 cesareans every year. It is unlikely this huge number of operations
could be performed without many serious complications and perhaps even some
maternal deaths.

Flamm, supra note 146, at 314.

172. Martin MacDowell et al., Understanding Birthing Mode Decision Making Using Artificial Neural Networks,

21 Med. Decision Making 433 (2001).
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time of labor, such as preeclampsia; (2) baby clinical characteristics, such as the
so-called “fetal distress” and malpresentation; and (3) patently non-clinical factors,
such as those related to the physician’s practice setting, financial parameters, legal
issues, and practitioner characteristics.173
The authors concluded that non-clinical factors were “important” in determining
the birthing mode, and “emphasized that a clinician’s decision on the appropriate
birthing mode is based not only on scientific understanding, but on other factors,
such as the mother’s attitude toward the birthing mode [and] the malpractice
environment . . . .”174 Physician convenience also appeared to be a factor: delivery
occurring during the day shift at a hospital was found to have the effect of increasing
the likelihood of a cesarean section.175 The authors interpreted the results as
suggesting possible ways of reducing the cesarean section rate, including by educating
the mother on the “advantages of a vaginal birth versus a cesarean section” and
“[e]ducating physicians about the appropriate use of induction.”176
	In one geographically localized study, it was shown that after issuance of ACOG’s
Practice Bulletin #5, “independent practitioners shut down their VBAC practice
because they could not treat patients in their clinic setting and simultaneously attend
a VBAC patient in a community hospital.”177 The authors of the study provided
additional detail on the economic considerations acknowledged, but glossed over
them in the bulletin itself. The study especially highlighted the discrepancies in
revenue experienced by hospitals between cesarean and vaginal deliveries.178
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Myers, supra note 5, at 528.
178. Id. at 528–29. The article notes:

Id.

Cesareans produce hospital revenues of $14,000 to $17,000 each, while vaginal deliveries
produce $6,000 to $8,000 each. Additionally, the hospital stands to receive additional
revenues because of the increased re-hospitalization rates related to cesarean delivery.
As for the OB/GYN practice? Vaginal deliveries produce no surgical fees. The recordhigh cesarean rate is likely to become an abstraction for executives and physicians who
observe its contribution to their bottom lines. The practical effect of the standard has
been to confer exclusive legitimacy for the performance of VBACs upon university and
tertiary-level medical centers staffed by surgeons, anesthesiologists, and surgical teams.
These islands of concentrated medical technology are not conveniently accessible to the
overwhelming majority of women who desire a VBAC . . . . The profit-and-loss
practicalities of medical practice prevent specialists and family practice physicians from
leaving their private clinics to attend at a community hospital the labor of women
awaiting a VBAC . . . . Whereas market restraints are acknowledged for their infliction
of economic harm, medical markets have the unique ability to inflict clinical harm,
injury, and even death upon consumers; . . . . The ACOG standard is illustrative of the
capacity of a private organization, exercising peer authority, to impose upon the broader
community mandates generally reserved to government . . . .
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D. Statutes Regulating Monopolies

	In order to appreciate fully the extent to which the rights of individuals may
potentially be violated by ACOG’s influence on VBAC services, one must analyze
that influence not only in regard to American health policy (as discussed supra), but
also in light of American economic policy supporting a competitive free market.179
	American public policy against monopolies is formalized in the federal Sherman
Act, which provides that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.”180 Monopoly power is “the power to control market prices or
exclude competition.”181
“The basic antitrust statutes are few in number: The Sherman Act of 1890; the
Clayton Act, first enacted in 1914 and significantly amended in 1936 by the
Robinson-Patman Act and in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act; and the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.”182
The Sherman Act “prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade, and [also] monopolization.”183 The high value our society places on free
trade is illustrated by the gravity of the sanctions. “Violation of the Sherman Act can
result in substantial fines and, for individual transgressors, prison terms.” In addition,
court orders restraining future violations are also available.184
The Clayton Act “deals with specific types of restraints including exclusive
dealing arrangements, tie-in sales, price discrimination, mergers and acquisitions,
and interlocking directorates.”185 Unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act “carries
only civil penalties and is enforced jointly by both the Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission.”186
The Federal Trade Commission Act, in contrast, is administered solely by the
Federal Trade Commission. This Act has been described as a “catch-all enactment
which has been construed to include all the prohibitions of the other antitrust laws
and, in addition, may be utilized to fill what may appear to be loopholes in the more
explicit regulatory statutes.”187
179. See generally D. Barlett et al., Critical Condition: How Health Care in America Became Big

Business—and Bad Medicine (Doubleday 2004).

180. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
181. U.S. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
182. Richard M. Steur, Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws, http://library.findlaw.com/1999/

Jan/1/241454.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).

183. Id.
184. Id. These provisions are enforced primarily by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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E. ACOG’s Policies in the Context of the Sherman Act

	Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade” that is unreasonable.188 This “rule of reason” is the
hallmark of judicial construction of the antitrust laws. The anti-competitive
consequences of a challenged practice are weighed against the business justifications
upon which it is predicated as well as its putative pro-competitive impact, and a
judgment with respect to its reasonableness is made.189
	Such an approach has obvious shortcomings. For one thing, reasonableness is an
ephemeral concept, and whether a particular course of conduct will ultimately be
found to be reasonable is not easy to predict when new business arrangements are
contemplated. Moreover, the task of enforcing a regulatory scheme based on such a
theory can be staggering.
“Trade associations, by their very nature, bristle with antitrust problems. Practically
by definition the requisite agreement is present, and the inquiry focuses on the nature
of the members’ concerted activity.”190 In truth, “ACOG is a ‘professional organization,’
which amounts to a trade union”191 and its VBAC recommendation has been singled
out for its restrictive effect on VBAC services.192 “In addition to this impact on women
and families and birth outcomes, this recommendation also has a major impact on
community-based midwives, family physicians, birth centers and small hospitals.”193
	Although certain “per se offenses” are obviously improper for an association,
“trade associations may properly act, under supervision, in many areas.”194 Statistical
reporting—including past costs, production, sales, and the like—seems to be the
most usual. Standardization may also be a proper association activity “as long as
standards which serve to lessen competition are avoided and all members are free to
disregard them.”195
Market structure is another key antitrust concern, and as such, antitrust law
“prohibits structural phenomena likely to substantially lessen competition or to
amount to monopolization.”196 In an effort to maintain a competitive economy, “the
structural aspect of the law focuses on avoiding or remedying the concentration of
market power in a few firms with large market shares.”197
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
189. See generally Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated

Handbook (2d ed., Thomson West 2006) (2000).

190. Steur, supra note 182.
191. Wagner, supra note 1, at 33.
192. See generally Wagner, supra note 144.
193. Id.
194. Steur, supra note 182. Such per se offenses include price fixing and market division.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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	Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize, a line of commerce. Liability is premised on
the “act of monopolization, which requires something more.” 198 “The offense of
monopolization, which is not purely structural, has two elements: (1) possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power.”199
This is the power to control prices or exclude competition, 200 practically “measured
by the alleged monopolist’s share of the relevant market.”201 Given the rarity of an
absolute monopoly, one is left to ponder “how large a share a firm must possess to
come within the statutory concept.”202 Although not explicitly defined, commentators
argue that “any market share of 50 percent or higher is sufficient to be of
concern.”203
“Once monopoly power is found, the question remains: Was it willfully acquired
or maintained?”204 This question is not easily answered. Although “sufficient” to
establish a violation, the Sherman Act “does not require that monopoly power be
abused or intentionally exercised to drive out competition.”205 Similarly, the Act does
not require that there be “an evil intent to eliminate competitors.”206 “Conscious acts
designed to further or maintain a monopoly market position will suffice.”207
	In addition to outlawing possession of monopoly power, “Section 2 of the
Sherman Act also prohibits attempts to monopolize by companies that do not possess
monopoly power but engage in anticompetitive conduct designed to achieve it.”208
Several factors must be shown in order to prove an attempt to monopolize, including
(1) “specific intent to achieve monopoly;” (2) anticompetitive conduct “designed to
injure . . . actual or potential competition;” and (3) “a dangerous probability that
monopoly power would in fact be achieved.”209 “Since companies that actually possess
monopoly power are an industrial rarity, most Section 2 litigation involves allegations
of attempts to monopolize; and it is the ‘dangerous probability of success’ element on
which the resolution of most cases turns.”210
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. See also E.I. duPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391.
201. Steur, supra note 182.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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F. Anti-Trust Implications of Restrictions Placed on VBAC Births

“Profit maximization has approximately the same presence in healthcare as it
does in banking, auto sales, lawyering, and other market endeavors.” 211 As noted
above, ACOG is functionally a trade union. Its VBAC policies resonate in the antitrust context. The so-called “clinical” restraints on VBAC services have defeated or
discouraged qualified competitors, particularly direct-entry midwives and familypractice physicians. This, in turn, has the inevitable effect of making such providers
effectively unavailable to women who would otherwise utilize their services.
The problem is compounded by the refusal of many hospitals to permit VBAC
on the premises, except those pursuant to the ACOG Practice Bulletin Guidelines,
for fear of compromising their health insurance coverage or increasing their
malpractice insurance rates. 212 In effect, such refusal forces a woman who would
prefer vaginal delivery or home birth to submit herself to the heightened risk of
surgical intervention in a hospital setting. This also effectively limits her selection of
care providers: “[M]ost [direct-entry midwives] can only practice outside the hospital
and most [certified nurse midwives] can only practice inside of hospitals. Thus . . . to
choose a particular kind of midwife is also to choose a particular place of birth.”213
Even more, to choose a non-physician care provider is to choose the place of birth;
and to choose a non-ob-gyn provider (even a family physician) is to choose a place of
birth—if such providers can be found who are willing to buck the ACOG trend.
The ACOG Committee on Ethics issued a statement in 2003 “declaring elective
cesareans to be ‘ethical,’ thereby providing its members with ‘an ethical pass to
perform a procedure that is proven more dangerous to women and babies.’”214 The
Committee “acknowledged cesarean risk in a release summarizing the results of a
study that found ‘a cesarean delivery significantly increased a woman’s risk of
experiencing a pregnancy-related death (35.9 deaths per 100,000 deliveries with a
live-birth outcome) compared to a woman who delivered vaginally (9.2 deaths per
100,000).’”215

211. Myers, supra note 5, at 527. See, e.g., Masid Ali, RDA: Rats Drugs and Assumption (Life Span

Press 1995); James P. Carter, Racketeering in Medicine: The Suppression of Alternatives
(Hampton Roads Publishing 1992); Rosemary Gibson & Janardan Prasad Singh, Wall of
Silence, The Untold Story of the Medical Mistakes that Kill and Injure Millions of
Americans (LifeLine Press 2003); Daniel Haley, Politics in Healing: Suppression and
Manipulation of American Medicine (Potomac Valley Press 2000); Hal A. Huggins & Thomas
E. Levy, Uninformed Consent, the Hidden Dangers in Dental Care 13 (Hampton Roads
Publishing, Inc. 1999); Eugene D. Robin, Matters of Life and Death: Risks vs. Benefits of
Medical Care 157–64 (W. H. Freeman & Co. 1984).

212. See generally ACOG Practice Bulletin #5, supra note 145; Bates, supra note 80.
213. Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45, at 534.
214. Myers, supra note 5, at 527.
215. Id.
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On close inspection, it is not difficult to discern the raging economic turf battle.
Maternity care is big business in the U.S., especially for hospitals.216 Of total hospital
stays for women, 25% are for pregnancy and childbirth.217 In 1999, delivery accounted
for about 270 hospitalizations for every 10,000 women. 218 Obstetricians are important
to a hospital’s financial success for a number of reasons, including the fact that they
influence around 11%, or $30 million, of inpatient charges through referrals to other
physicians within the hospital. 219 In other words, obstetrical care is still a major
marketing tool for hospitals; when a woman needs hospitalization for herself or for a
family member, she will tend to stick with the hospital where she gave birth.
Consider that 99% of births occur in hospitals, of which more than 25% are
cesarean sections, and that home birth costs as little as one-sixth the cost of an
uncomplicated vaginal birth in the hospital.220 There is an unspoken assumption that
physicians’ decisions should not be questioned, so there is no regulation by
disinterested parties. At the same time, “there are virtually no consumer pressures . .
. no restraints on anti-competitive practices . . . no meaningful consumer protections
. . . no accountability for the health and well-being of mothers and babies.”221
	Despite these facts, bringing anti-trust policy to bear on provisions regarding
birthing services has proven difficult, especially when the “injured” parties are not
economic competitors deprived of a livelihood, but instead patients who have been
effectively denied access to a certain type of service. 222 While doctors enter into
agreements with hospitals, insurers and practice partners may be held accountable for
these entities. Thus, there has been little in the way of regulatory or other institutional
mechanisms to hold doctors accountable to patients.223
Under certain state laws, a hospital’s refusal to appoint a healthcare professional
to its medical staff is either not subject to judicial review, or is subject only to limited
216. Figures published in 1999 show that the cost of home births typically range between $2300 and $5000;

birth center births between $3500 and $8300; hospital births between $4300 and $16000; and caesarean
section births top costs with a range between $9300 and $26000. Peggy O’Mara, Having a Baby
Naturally 322 (2003).

217. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research & Policy,

Healthcare Cost & Utilization Project (HCUP) Fact Book No. 3, Care of Women in U.S.
Hospitals (2000), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/factbk3/factbk3.htm.

218. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Health Resources & Services Administration,

Maternal Child and Health Bureau, Woman’s Health USA 2002 (2002), available at http://
mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa02/Page_68.htm.

219. Kathleen C. Hanold, OB/GYNs Offer a Rich Source of Referrals, Marketing Health Services, Fall

2002, at 12.

220. See O’Mara, supra note 216, at 138–39, 322.
221. Susan Hodges & Henci Goer, Effects of Hospital Economics on Maternity Care, reprinted in Citizens for

Midwifery News Vol. 9, Issue 1, Spring/Summer 2004, available at http://cfmidwifery.org/resources/
item.aspx?id=32.

222. See generally Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45.
223. See Marc A. Rodwin, Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest

11–34, 162–75 (Oxford University Press 1993).
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review because of the reluctance of judges to substitute their judgment for that of
decision-makers in private organizations.224
	Even direct Sherman Act challenges often fail as a vehicle due to the difficulties
inherent in proving the key elements of a Sherman Act claim. Generally speaking,
the continuing reliance of federal courts on economic theory in antitrust cases has
had a profound impact on antitrust claims brought in the healthcare context, because
the economic approach demands proof that output is restricted in order to show the
required foreclosure of competition and, thus, the establishment of an antitrust
violation.225 Restricted output can be very difficult to show in the healthcare context.
In particular, services are provided nationwide in a decentralized fashion without a
central database or other tracking service. Like the gathering of any data from local
sources, such an effort is labor-intensive and time-consuming, involves the surveying
of hundreds or thousands of local facilities, and perhaps tens of thousands of women
(if not more).
	According to Amnesty International, nursing and midwifery services contribute
to international health improvements, inter alia, by promoting gender equality
through the education of girls and women about health issues, by reducing child and
maternal mortality, and by delivering maternal and child health services.226 Yet these
practitioners are stymied, and therefore their would-be clients denied these benefits,
when competition with ob-gyns is suppressed in favor of a medical monopoly that is
not justified by the medical evidence.
	Democratic, non-legislative methods are sometimes relied on to correct
monopolistic tendencies. One important method in a free society is the use of exit—
that is, consumers exiting from one provider to “purchase” medical services from
another provider elsewhere.227 The women’s health movement has been cited as one
example of the “exit” correction to monopolistic tendencies. 228 Yet, exit is not a
feasible remedy when monopolistic restraints have thwarted alternative providers.
224. See, e.g., Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln

Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 737–38 (Ill. 1989); Barrows v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 525 N.E.2d
50, 50 (Ill. 1988); Lapidot v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 494 N.E.2d 838, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Rao v. St.
Elizabeth’s Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 685, 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).

225. E.g., Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, No. 80 C 1405, 1991 WL 5827 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15,

1991) (first inquiry is whether the defendant possesses market power).

226. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 13, at 2, 54, 65, 89, 95–97.
227. See generally Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,

Organizations, and States 3–4 (Harvard University Press 1970); Albert O. Hirschman, Rival
Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays 78 (Viking Penguin Inc. 1986); A.H. Birch,
Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,’ 5 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 69, 73–74
(1975); Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent
Contributions, 58 Milbank Memorial Fund Q./ Health & Soc’y 430, 450 (1980); Rudolph Klein,
Models of Man and Models of Policy: Reflections on “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” Ten Years Later, 58 Milbank
Memorial Fund Q./ Health & Soc’y 416, 417 (1980); Brian Barry, Review Article: “Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty”, 4 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 79, 86 (1974).

228. See Rodwin, supra note 53, at 150.
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Often, doctors “act as gatekeepers for many health care resources.”229 And “while the
women’s health movement has had some positive effects on medicine, change has
been slow and partial.”230
There is one silver lining, however: Antitrust jurisprudence is gradually evolving
to determine whether certain conduct reduces the output of products or services, as
opposed to a stricter economic-impact analysis.231 Viewed through this lens, ACOG’s
restrictive policies that influence the ability of a woman to freely choose VBAC seem
to run counter to the American policy of anti-monopolistic provision of services.
	As discussed supra, the so-called “clinical” constraints on VBAC services have
driven many qualified competitors out of the market, particularly direct-entry
midwives, nurse practitioners, and family physicians. This, in turn, has the inevitable
effect of making such providers effectively unavailable to women who would
otherwise utilize their services.232
This, then, is the nexus between the anti-competitive nature of ACOG policies
and the human rights of individual American women: deprivation of entire portions
of the maternity-care spectrum routinely available to women in other countries. Even
in those instances when women are able to avail themselves of a direct-entry midwife,
for example, their care may be compromised due to factors beyond the midwife’s
control. Physician resistance to midwifery and out-of-hospital birth may result in
denigration of the pregnant women or midwives involved, or even denial of services
in the form of refusal to accept an emergency transport to a hospital from a home
birth due to failure to progress, medical emergency, or exhaustion of the mother. 233
As noted by leading scholar Robbie Davis-Floyd: “[Midwives] and their clients
sometimes suffer in extreme ways from the effects of such [negative] stereotypes . . . .
It is one thing to proudly hold a countercultural space in which women can make
alternative choices, and another to watch your clients suffer the effects of the negative
stereotyping of midwives.”234

229. Id. at 159.
230. Id. at 163.

Id.

Professional power is still strong and often determines how health services are performed. Despite
the women’s movement’s efforts to allow women greater control over childbirth, trends exist that
counter such control. For example, births by cesarean section in the United States have increased
steadily from 4.5% in 1965 to 24% in 1986 and stayed around this level until 1991. Despite efforts
by women’s groups and consumers, women frequently have been forced to have cesarean sections
against their will . . . [thus] the women’s movement has had only limited effects on changing
practices.

231. Peter M. Sfikas, Antitrust Challenges by Allied Health Care Professionals Involving Hospital Staff Privileges,

J. Health & Hosp. L., Dec. 1991, at 361.

232. See generally Rodwin, supra note 53, at 150.
233. See Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45.
234. Id. at 168.
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	It is generally recognized that the interests of the consumer are usually “better
served by competitive forces in the market place.”235 There is a generalized concern
that expresses itself in various governmental policies—some being part of decisional
and statutory law—against combinations and agreements that operate to restrain or
encumber trade.236
	In this sense, the VBAC restrictions implicate the rights of pregnant women not
only as patients, but as consumers of goods and services in a free market. There is
also a potential discriminatory undercurrent: pregnant women are singled out for this
particular brand of abasement and jeopardy.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has recommended
collaboration between physicians and midwives as one avenue of enhancing
availability of birthing services. 237 According to its Commentary on Obstetricians
and Midwives: “We believe . . . that the most effective systems are not one provider
over another but collaborative teams of physicians and advanced practice professionals
combining their skills to maximize treatment and educational strategies that can
improve the health of women.”238
The output of birthing services has been restricted not only in the ways discussed
above (VBAC limitations, promotion of C-sections generally, etc.), but also by
targeting midwives to discourage them from providing birthing services. These
efforts include educational or (depending on one’s point of view) propagandistic
efforts condemning home birth as a form of child abuse, and otherwise discouraging
out-of-hospital births.239
	ACOG divisions have taken steps to collect reports on out-of-hospital births. For
example, the Wisconsin Section of ACOG issued a notice to its members that it
“would like to document any adverse outcomes that physicians might encounter in
their practice by patients who are assisted by professional midwives.”240 To what use
might such anecdotal reports be put? ACOG is the self-described “voice of women’s
health” (albeit without benefit of the blessing of the women for whom it claims to
speak) and as such urges its members “to become more active at every level of
government.”241 ACOG educates its members that it is “[m]ost difficult to have an
235. Vt. Nat’l Bank v. Chittenden Trust Co., 465 A.2d 284, 287 (Vt. 1983).
236. See, e.g., State v. Heritage Realty, 407 A.2d 509 (Vt. 1979); The Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2453

(2009); The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006);
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (2006).

237. Hal C. Lawrence, Not Either/Or, but Obstetricians and Midwives Together, Pub. Health Rep. 1997,

Sept./Oct. 1997.

238. Id.
239. Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45, at 32–33.
240. ACOG Wisconsin Section, Adverse Outcomes Midwife Births, http://www.acog.org/acog_sections/

dist_notice.cfm?recno=17&bulletin=1821 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).

241. See, e.g., Press Release, Kenneth L. Noller, President, ACOG (June 4, 2007), available at http://cache.

zoominfo.com/CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=-2140757529&page_url=%2f %2fwww.tuftsnemc.org%2fhome%2fnews%2fnemcnews%2f2007%2f0700604.htm&page_last_updated=11%2f11%2
f2007+5%3a34%3a46+AM&firstName=Kenneth&lastName=Noller.
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effective legislative presence without a dedicated lobbyist” and that a state section
“must develop its legislative committee and its legislative agenda before hiring a
lobbyist.”242 ACOG has an active “Government Relations Committee” that sponsors
an Annual Lobbyist Roundtable and encourages the “growing” of “ACOG’s advocacy
in the state capitals” to defeat legislative initiatives that would legalize, regulate, or
otherwise encourage the practice and professionalization of midwifery.243
	It is no surprise that ACOG called for neither “anecdotes” about good-outcome
midwife services, nor for bad-outcome ob-gyn deliveries. Negative publicity is typically
generated by a bad-outcome, midwife-attended birth, but is “rarely applied to negative
hospital outcomes.”244 Robbie Davis-Floyd writes of the “damaging stereotypes hospital
practitioners tend to create and disseminate about direct-entry midwives” and observes:
“[A] death at home rings loud cultural alarm bells, sounding the culturally ingrained
message that home birth is an irresponsible choice for mothers, and that home-birth
midwives must be far less competent that [sic] hospital-based practitioners.”245 One can
readily perceive the damage this wreaks on the midwives themselves emotionally,
professionally, and financially. More to the point of this paper, however, is the damage
done to the laboring mother who has exercised her right to choose the services of a
midwife and give birth at home. Both midwives “and their clients . . . suffer in extreme
ways from the effects of such stereotypes. . . .” 246 One commentator notes that
“obstetricians are vehemently opposed to midwives and have gone to great lengths to
drive them out of business,” with all of “the fervor of an old-fashioned witch hunt,”
242. ACOG, District VIII Annual District Advisory Council, Meeting Minutes (Nov. 7, 2006), available at

http://www.acog.org/acog_districts/dist8/2006AdvisoryAgenda.pdf.

243. Id.

Id.

On the issue of midwives, the committee discussed how the lack of comparative data on
midwife-assisted birth outcomes hinders our efforts as ob-gyns, and explored ways to
assist Fellows in responding to midwife bills in their state. It was proposed that ACOG
collect anecdotes from Fellows who have been back-up or on call for midwife-assisted
deliveries that ended in an adverse outcome.

244. Mainstreaming Midwives, supra note 45, at 169.
245. Id. at 167, 532.
246. Id. at 168.

One of the most significant and challenging of these barriers is hospital and physician
resistance to midwives, which is sometimes purely economically motivated, and sometimes
motivated by an erroneous belief that midwives are not really competent professionals—at
least not as competent as the doctors themselves. CNMs [Certified Nurse Midwives]
experience physician or hospital administrator resistance when they are overscrutinized
. . . or fired outright in large numbers, or when physicians refuse to provide backup for
their birth center, homebirth practices, and even hospital practices, and/or harass the
few physicians that do . . . . DEMs [direct entry midwives] experience physician
resistance in the form of the same refusal of backup care, insulting treatment in the
hospital when they transport a patient, investigation of their practices by physicians
determined to shut them down . . . and heavy lobbying by professional medical
organizations against legislation to legalize and regulate DEMs in various states.

Id. at 527–28.
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thus resulting in fewer options for women.247 In many regions of the United States, a
pregnant woman who wants the care of a midwife can’t get it unless she’s willing to
go outside mainstream healthcare channels, and, in some areas, even risks being
persecuted and/or prosecuted herself.248
v. A proposal for change through transparency and litigation

OPENNESS, honest and complete OPENNESS—
that is the first condition of health in all societies.249
A. A Call for Transparency

The process of changing physicians’ practice patterns to reduce cesarean birth
rates is not an easy one. Numerous organizations including “government agencies,
professional associations, physician leaders, managed care organizations, and
consulting groups have all struggled with this issue for more than 20 years.”250
The American founders believed “in the enlightened choice of the people, free
from the interference of a policeman’s intrusive thumb or a judge’s heavy hand.”251
The free flow of information is a matter not only of legal rights, but also of good
public policy in the realm of scientific endeavors. Andrei Sakharov, recipient of both
the Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Prize for Physics, stated that he is “convinced
that freedom of conscience, together with the other civic rights, provides the basis for
scientific progress and constitutes a guarantee that scientific advances will not be
used to despoil mankind . . . .”252
247. Wagner, supra note 1, at 10.
248. Id.
249. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Letter to the Secretariat of the Soviet Writers’ Union, 1969, in A Documentary

History of Human Rights 483 (Jon E. Lewis ed., 2003).

250. Elliott K. Main, Reducing Caesarean Birth Rates with Data-driven Quality Improvement Activities, 103

Paediatrics 374, 374–81 (1999).

	Although the national and state rates are now 10% to 20% below their peak in
1988 (which translates to a 1% to 3% reduction in the total cesarean rate), most are not
near the national Healthy Person 2000 goal of 15% . . . . [M]idwife-centered care has
led to some of the lowest cesarean birth rates in the United States . . . . [C]hanging
behaviors of highly educated adults is not an easy task.
Id.

251. Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463, 498 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
252. Andrei Sakharov, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, Peace, Progress, Human Rights (Dec. 11, 1975), available

at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1975/sakharov-lecture.html.

Id.

We need reform, not revolution. We need a pliant, pluralist, tolerant community, which
selectively and tentatively can bring about a free, undogmatic use of the experiences of
all social systems . . . . [L]ike faint glimmers of light in the dark, we have emerged . . . .
We must . . . create a life worthy of ourselves and of the goals we only dimly perceive.

96

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

	Science provides the moniker for one offspring of the free-speech evolution:
“transparency.” To scientists, a transparent object is one that does not conceal what is
on the other side. To social scientists, transparency in government and in nongovernmental institutions of public importance is a counterpoint to secrecy, and
facilitates openness and participation through public accessibility, review, and debate.
Transparency discourages abuse of power by those who hold it, inter alia, by making
it easier to discern poor judgment or intentional wrong-doing on the part of decisionmakers, and holding them accountable to improve the system.
Transparency has been applied in many different contexts to promote
accountability within government. For example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts rely
heavily on required disclosures and the transparency of bankruptcy proceedings to
avert corruption and promote equity. 253 Similar techniques are utilized in family
courts vis-à-vis distribution of the marital estate254 and the U.S. General Accounting
Office, which has called for greater transparency in federal spending and recordkeeping to promote accountability.255
The principle of transparency is applied not only to governments, but to
corporations and other non-governmental entities within the United States. The call
for enhanced transparency has increased in volume since the Enron disaster. Even
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission joined the fray, calling for transparent
disclosure in the wake of the Enron debacle.256
	According to one scholar, a “physician-based healthcare system that has grown
beyond critical bounds . . . obscures the political conditions that render society
unhealthy; and it tends to mystify and to expropriate the power of the individual to
heal himself and to shape his or her environment.”257
The doctrine of informed consent, as applied in the context of childbirth, creates
a duty of disclosure upon a physician to present her patient with information on not
only the material risks involved in undergoing natural childbirth, but also the risks
associated with having a cesarean section.258 “In the childbirth context, physician . . . .
253. See, e.g., McVay v. Phouminh (In re Phouminh), 339 B.R. 231 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005); In re Riccardo,

248 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).

254. Breen, G., et al., Bankruptcy, Family Law Strengthened To Stop Bankrupts’ Torts (Increasing Transparency),

J. Banking & Fin. Services, Oct. 2004.

255. Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the U.S., Truth and Transparency: The Federal

Government’s Financial Condition and Fiscal Outlook (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
cghome/npc917.pdf.

256. Ken Rankin, SEC Warns Investors Need Transparent Disclosure in Wake of Enron Debacle (Assurance

Forum), Accounting Today, Jan. 2002.

257. Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health 16 (Penguin

Books 1976).

258. Physicians are required to disclose: (1) the risks of a particular method of treatment; (2) alternative

methods of treatment; (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment; and (4) the results
likely to occur if the patient remains untreated. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781–82 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561–62 (D.C. 1982); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, 217
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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bias towards cesarean sections may inf luence their ability to provide adequate
information about childbirth methods.”259 In a violation of fiduciary duty, “[p]hysicians
who find it in their best interest to perform the surgery may reveal incomplete
information to a patient deciding between a cesarean or natural childbirth.”260
Transparency is also called for in the larger American birth context through free
access to the data and procedures utilized by ACOG—the standard-setter for
American birthing practices—in its formulation of clinical recommendations. 261
Not surprisingly, the corporate world resists opening its secrets to outside scrutiny.
It often cites the “trade secret privilege” to justify drawing a veil over its workings. 262
The trade secret doctrine, however, is an “oddball” privilege263 that is “difficult to
justify, especially when the law does not recognize privileges for many more deserving
sorts of information, e.g., parent child communications.”264
One should resist the temptations of naiveté and acknowledge that the talk of
trade secrets and confidential business information may well be used to “protect the
public” from knowledge important to public well-being. “Corporations have tried to
use trade secret claims to conceal workplace hazards, the ingredients of harmful
products, and discriminatory hiring practices as well as to . . . keep information from
unions that would assist them in carrying out their collective bargaining
responsibilities, and to prevent the release of regulatory data.”265
	ACOG materials are limited, for the most part, to its own members, with further
dissemination prohibited. The author of this paper was denied access to ACOG
committee reports and minutes of meetings relating to development of VBAC
standards, despite a willingness to comply with any purchase requirements.266 There
appears to be no public library in the country that has a complete set—or anywhere
near it—of ACOG-generated documents, including those consulted or developed in
259. Bates, supra note 80, at 400.
260. Id.
261. In lobbying efforts, ACOG has represented itself to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as “the

body which establishes standards of care for the ob-gyn profession.” Letter from Ralph W. Hale, ACOG
to the Dockets Management Branch of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 1, 2000), p. 1,
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/00/Nov00/111500/cp0001.pdf.

262. See 26 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedures,

§ 5642, 288 (1992).

263. Id.
264. Id. at 350. A leading commentator observes further:

To say that the basis of trade secret law is “commercial ethics” is to beg the question of
its justification by assuming that business secrecy is justified. As the example of science
suggests, it is quite possible to imagine social institutions that involve the same
competing values of individualism, competition and innovation as the commercial
world yet which embrace an ethics of openness.

Id. at 295–96.
265. Id. at 316–18.

266. Personal communications with ACOG home office research service, July & Aug. 2007 (on file with

author).
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relation to the 1999 “reevaluation” of the VBAC standards in response to ACOG’s
“malpractice suit” concern. Similarly, the “anecdotal” evidence ACOG gathers on
midwife-attended births with bad outcomes is not available to the public.
The July 5, 2001 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine contained a study
and an accompanying editorial that focused international media attention on the
VBAC issue and set off a flurry of activity on internet sites and in doctors’ offices all
over the world. 267 The headlines suggested that new research supported repeat
cesareans over VBAC, causing a number of physicians to opine that repeat cesareans
were as safe as, or safer than, vaginal birth. Less attention was paid to subsequent
attacks on both the study and the journal editorial, written by Michael E. Greene,
M.D. The study contained “little new or groundbreaking information and relie[d] on
questionable data collection.”268
“[T]ake a closer look,” wrote Jill MacCorkle, author of Fighting VBAC-lash:
Critiquing Current Research, Mothering. Ms. MacCorkle contends that overuse of
medical intervention in childbirth has transformed ordinary vaginal birth into major
surgery. She argues that a “careful critique exposes the limitations of . . . the current
medical model of childbirth, raising the question of whether that model still holds
any credibility for pregnant women.”269 A noted critic of current obstetrical practice,
Dr. Flamm, observed: “Even the charts of the women believed to have experienced
uterine rupture, the very focus of this study, were apparently not available for
review.”270
B. A Need for Litigation

	As discussed above, ACOG is already sensitive to potential legal liability arising
from the dreaded malpractice lawsuits. This aspect of its corporate sub-culture may
be useful in procuring greater respect for, and compliance with, the human rights of
women who come within the purview of ACOG practice bulletins, guidelines, and
practices.
	Indeed, ACOG is no stranger to legal considerations: “ACOG also uses fear of
litigation to control doctors and hospitals. If doctors and hospitals go against one of
their recommendations, they are more vulnerable to litigation.”271

267. See, e.g., Rita Rubin, Vaginal Births After C-Section Risk Uterine Damage, USA Today, July 5, 2001, at

9D; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Risk is Found in Natural Birth After Cesarean, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2001, at
A1; Deborah Josefson, Vaginal Delivery After Cesarean Section Triples Risk of Uterine Rupture, BMJ, July
5, 2001; Press Release, American College of Nurse-Midwives, ACNM Calls for Definitive VBAC
Study (July 3, 2001).

268. Jill MacCorkle, Fighting VBAC-lash: Critiquing Current Research, Mothering, Jan.–Feb. 2002, available
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269. Id.
270. Bruce Flamm, Vaginal Birth After Cesarean and the New England Journal of Medicine: A Strange

Controversy, Birth, Dec. 2001, at 276–79.

271. Wagner, supra note 1, at 27.
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Ob-gyns are already trained to fear the devil they know: malpractice lawsuits.
The devil they don’t know—but which could prove even more fearsome—is the
human rights lawsuit for the procural of patient consent absent full disclosure of the
non-medical motivations embedded in American birthing recommendations, and for
violating consumers’ right to unrestrained trade in the maternity-care field.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. American Birth Recommendations Violate International Human Rights Norms

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and wellbeing . . . .”272 This is a generally accepted international norm. In the U.S., however,
it is unduly difficult and dangerous for a woman who gives birth to freely seek her
choice of maternity-care providers on an informed basis. This endangers her health
and well-being.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
“recognize[s] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health.”273 Patently, the U.S. has the resources to provide—
and, in many medical specialties, does provide—the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health. Birthing is an exception, as demonstrated by the disparity
between the rate of C-sections, the rate of unnecessary C-sections, and the maternal
death rate between the U.S. and other industrialized countries.
	According to WHO, “the right to health should be understood as extending
beyond health care to . . . access to health-related education and information,
including on sexual and reproductive health.”274 The secrecy surrounding ACOG
standard-setting and its underlying medical evidentiary basis defeats efforts to
provide an appropriate education, and full and fair information, to women faced with
birthing decisions.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women requires “all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women . . . in particular to ensure . . . access to specific educational information to
help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and
advice on family planning.”275 This has not occurred in the United States, where
information residing within ACOG on the rationale and underlying data supporting
the VBAC standards is difficult for the public to obtain.
The Preamble to the Constitution of WHO provides: “The enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human
being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social
condition.” 276 The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires subscribing
272. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 25.
273. Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, supra note 11, at art. 12.
274. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 13, at 49–50.
275. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, supra note 19, at art. 10.
276. WHO Const., pmbl., supra note 15.
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countries to “take appropriate measures . . . [t]o ensure appropriate pre-natal and
post-natal health care for mothers.” 277 Both these standards are violated by the
unnecessarily high American rate of C-sections and maternal death, and the de facto
discrimination against pregnant women in relation to their ability to make informed
birthing choices.
B. American Birth Recommendations Violate American Human Rights Norms

	Every person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her own body. No
person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. Even with
the belief that it is safer for mother and/or baby for birth to occur in a hospital, no
action may be taken to interfere with parental choice unless there is a hearing—with
adequate due-process safeguards—forcing the accuser to carry the burden of proof,
allowing both sides to be heard, and resulting in a hearing based on the evidence.
	Every person is constitutionally entitled to a presumption of mental competence
(comparable to presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings) until there is an
adjudication—meeting due process requirements—to the contrary. There is no
exception to this rule for pregnant women; they do not lose their legal presumption
of mental competence by becoming pregnant.
	A mother is presumed to be the legal representative of her child, unless and until
the state—in compliance with the due process clause—terminates or restricts parental
rights, including the right to make medical choices for her child. The general
constitutional rule is that unless a mother is proven to be “unfit,” the state cannot
interfere. If there are allegations of unfitness, such as abuse or neglect, the accuser
must bring the appropriate charges and prove his or her case before interfering with
maternal choice.
Therefore, a mother’s right to make medical decisions for herself cannot be
intruded upon except through proper adjudication—in compliance with the due
process clause—that she is unfit to make those decisions. There is no legal principle
that would by fiat exclude pregnant women from these rules of law.
C. Importance of Transparency as a Partial Remedy

	Since the founders’ eighteenth-century antipathy to government restrictions on
free speech, their ardor for the “enlightened choice of the people” has evolved into a
broader romance with the free flow of information throughout society in general.
“Rules that limit access, encourage secrecy or curtail participation must be strictly
construed because they run counter to the great countervailing principles of openness
and participation. A facile or insouciant resort to pragmatic remedies soon results in
the tail wagging the dog.”278
277. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 20, art. 24.
278. Schwartz, et al. v. Celestial Seasonings, Order Den. Mot. To File Ex. Under Seal, No. 95-K-1045 (D.

Colo. Jan. 22, 1998) (articulating “my responsibility as a judge to avoid concealment of the judicial
process from public view.”) (citing M.M. v. Zavaras, 939 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding
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Rewarding the (presumed) superior intellect and investment of physicians via
greater compensation and prestige at the expense of pregnant women does not justify
current American birth practices.
While it is true that our culture generally approves of . . . cleverness . . . one
has to look only to the ‘sucker-punch,’ the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the law
of fraud to see that at some point this admiration for the clever passes over
into sympathy for the justifiably ignorant. . . . [I]t would be enough to answer
that we are all ‘free-riders’ on the intelligence and effort of our ancestors. 279

	An increase in transparency—through the doctrine of informed consent—will
inevitably lead to greater patient protection as physicians present their patients with
information not only on the material risks involved in undergoing natural childbirth,
but also on the risks associated with having a cesarean section. 280
D. Importance of Litigation as a Partial Remedy

Certainly, it is fashionable to deride lawyers (amongst whom the author counts
herself), and to lament the “litigious nature” of our society, as some doctors—
particularly ob-gyns—are fond of doing, fomenting fear with talk of the “malpractice
crisis” and other bogeymen. This is a red herring.
	Defensive medicine is harmful to pregnant women. Ob-gyns exist to serve
women, primarily pregnant women. Given that the financial benefits incurred by
physicians still outweigh the financial risks, are we to believe that the ob-gyn
specialty is in any real danger of extinction? This borders on the fatuous. In other
words, ob-gyns are still making money they view as adequate to compensate them
for their work—or else we would have no ob-gyns.
	Is it so radical to believe that practicing good medicine, rather than defensive
medicine, would be its own reward, both financially and emotionally? While Dr.
Wagner acknowledges the prevalence of litigation against American obstetricians
and high ob-gyn insurance premiums in the medical world, he explains that
something more than financial cost is needed to explain obstetricians’ “extreme
attitude” toward practicing defensive medicine. “In an obstetrician’s daily professional
world, everyone . . . looks up to him and follows his orders . . . . [B]eing an obstetrician
in the obstetric world is like living as an animal with no natural predators. A
courtroom is not in the obstetric world. Predators lurk in the courtroom.”281
The rule of law is a fundamental value in this country. It forces people to account
for their behavior. It is powerful and, for the most part, positive.
There is already a substantial body of law on medical malpractice. There is
already an extensive constitutional jurisprudence on bodily autonomy and integrity.
that any privacy interest plaintiff had in remaining anonymous was “decisively outweigh[ed]” by the
countervailing public interest in openness)).
279. Wright, supra note 262, at n.56–57.
280. See supra note 258.
281. Wagner, supra note 1, at 153.
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	Invocation of human rights norms—both personal and economic—in relation to
American birth choices and services is the case yet to be brought, with a plaintiff yet
to be heard.
That means the jury is still out.
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